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1. Introduction  
1.1 Introduction to topic  
Grave human rights abuses and the “core crimes” of international criminal law: genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression, are no stranger to impunity. To 
fight the impunity of  these crimes, in 1998 the Rome Statute was signed, and with it the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court, with the goal to prosecute those most 
responsible for the crimes committed under its jurisdiction.1 However, this Court is limited to 
the prosecution or “natural persons,”2 so what happens when the crime is committed not by a 
single individual, but an entire corporation?  
Corporate liability for international crimes is a subject gaining more and more traction, though 
traditionally not often discussed. Within the last couple years there has been more of debate 
surrounding the concept of corporate liability, but with the corporate structure created with 
protections in mind, as well as different domestic approaches to corporate law, finding the 
arena or even a legal basis by which to hold accountable corporations for their commission of 
or contribution to mass atrocities is extremely difficult. After World War II international law 
was mobilized in a way not previously seen before. During the Nuremberg Trials the Tribunal 
held that: 
“Crimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract entities, and only 
by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international 
law be enforced.”3  
As such, there was an understanding that the prosecution of corporations crimes under 
international law was not possible because they are abstract entities.  This sentiment is shared 
by some legal scholars who assert that a corporation itself cannot be held liable for crimes, 
 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, entered into force 1  
July 2002) 2187 UNTS 38544 (‘Rome Statute’).  
2 Rome Statute, Article 25.  
3 The Trial of Major War Criminals before International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Judgement) (1947) 
Vol. 1, p. 223.  
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only its employees can.4 However, such perspective has not adapted with the changing 
landscape of the role of corporations. Previously, laws protecting individual rights were based 
on the principle that an individual required protection from the state, not a private actor. 
However, through globalization some corporations are now more powerful than some 
countries, and as such have the power to perpetrate abuses previously only considered possible 
by a state. In 2018, 25 of the world’s largest corporations made more profit than certain 
countries,5 highlighting that now private companies are gaining more power than that of the 
state. The significance of this is that some corporations have the power to commit the same, if 
not more, egregious abuses than states. Through power, money, and influence corporations can 
effectively act as a “quasi-state” in which they receive the same benefits without the same 
levels of accountability.6 States for example, are bound by treaties and can be held accountable 
through judicial processes at the International Court of Justice (herein “ICJ”);7 corporate 
entities, however, are not bound by treaties, and as this paper explores, do not have the same 
sort accountability mechanisms.   
Arguably, major corporations may not be the ones directly committing obvious human rights 
violations, as the exposure of this and the “court of public opinion” could badly damage their 
brand, and thus their profit-making capabilities. However, this is not always the case, as 
illustrated by the fact that Chiquita bananas are still present in grocery stores across the world 
despite the company’s well-known funding of armed groups in Colombia, responsible grave 
breaches of human rights.8 Although businesses hold a certain duty of care and should not be 
engaging in activities that contribute to violations of international criminal law,  through the 
complexities of multinational corporations, operations in conflict-affected regions, public 
 
4 See for example, Allens Arthur Robinson, ‘’Corporate Culture’ as a Basis for Criminal Liability of 
Corporations’ (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, February 2008) <https://www.business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Allens-Arthur-Robinson-Corporate-Culture-paper-for-
Ruggie-Feb-2008.pdf> accessed 29 July 2020, p.1. 
5 For example, if Apple were a country it would rank 47th in the world in terms of GDP, and Walmart as a 
corporation had revenues in 2017 that were greater than the GDP of Belgium in 2016. Fernando Belinchón and 
Ruqayyah Moynihan, ‘25 Giant Companies That Are Bigger than Entire Countries’ (Business Insider España, 
25 July 2018) <www.businessinsider.com/25-giant-companies-that-earn-more-than-entire-countries-2018-7> 
accessed 5 July 2020.  
6 Originally referring to technology corporations, but can be applied more broadly in terms of revenues and 
influence. Alexa Koenig, ‘It's Complicated: Why #DeleteFacebook Is Bad for Human Rights – And What  We 
Should Do Instead’ (Medium, 9 Apr. 2018) <medium.com/humanrightscenter/its-complicated-why-
deletefacebook-is-bad-for-human-rights-and-what-we-should-do-instead-18448489bf48> accessed 5 July 2020.  
7 See for example, The Gambia suing Myanmar for violations of the Genocide Convention at the ICJ. 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. 
Myanmar) (Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for Provisional Measures) 11 November 2019.  
8 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘Chiquita Lawsuits (re Colombia)’ <https://www.business-
humanrights.org/en/chiquita-lawsuits-re-colombia> accessed 29 July 2020.  
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indifference, and no robust accountability mechanisms they are able to do so with little, if any, 
consequences. 
In this paper, the author outlines the different possible avenues for approaching corporate 
criminal liability for violations of international criminal law and argues that there is precedent, 
albeit embryonic, to pursue these types of claims at the international criminal level; however, 
a more cohesive approach at the domestic level is required to do so.  In order to effectively 
address this topic, the author presents the research question: how are the current mechanisms 
in place facilitating corporate criminal liability for violations of the core international crimes? 
To help answer this question the author also examines the following sub-questions: is there a 
legal basis to prosecute corporations as a whole for such abuses on an international level? To 
what extent are domestic jurisdictions handling these processes? What are the issues common 
across domestic jurisdictions? 
 
1.2 Research Purpose and Motivation  
This research is particularly relevant because of the sheer volume of corporate accountability 
cases that are reportedly being met with impunity and perpetuating a culture which allows for 
gross violations of human rights to be committed by corporations. Much of international 
humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international criminal law centers 
around the commission of abuses by the State, organized armed groups or individual persons. 
However, in the twenty-first century, it is becoming increasingly apparent that violations are 
not only committed by such types of actors, but can also be facilitated or even directly 
perpetrated, by corporate entities. Moreover, corporations are able to hide behind their non-
natural person status and as such avoid accountability for involvement, complicity, and even 
blatant execution of atrocities.  In an era where some corporations are more powerful than some 
state actors, it is imperative to seek means for creating and enforcing accountability. This 
research fills the gap in the current literature by presenting how to conceptualize corporate 
criminal liability for violations of international criminal law, addressing domestic policies and  
international legal foundations, and proposing new recommendations.  
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2. Methodology 
In this thesis the author assesses the current mechanisms governing corporate liability for 
atrocity crimes through addressing a specific research question and sub-questions. The research 
is done primarily using qualitative research methods. According to Williams (2007), qualitative 
research “builds its premise on inductive, rather than deductive reasoning,” and this allows for 
an observational relationship creating a strong connection between the data and the observer.9 
This research consists of a mixed method approach,10 using content analysis of ongoing 
frameworks, multilateral agreements, and an examination of documents from both 
international tribunals as well as domestic courts, along with some case studies as examples.  
The author examines primary source documents pertaining to business and human rights at an 
international level. This includes an analysis of the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (herein “OECD”) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the United 
Nations (herein “UN”) Global Compact, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, and to some extent the Draft Treaty on Business and Human Rights in evaluating if and 
how these mechanisms support corporate criminal liability. This paired with analysis of the 
framework of self-regulation with respect to corporate social responsibility, to draw a picture 
of the mechanisms surrounding business governance in terms of doing business “responsibly”.  
In addition, the author examines three different international tribunals’ approaches to corporate 
liability in the international criminal context, focusing on the International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg (herein “IMT”), the International Criminal Court (herein “ICC”), and the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (herein “STL”), looking at their founding documents, as well as case 
law, with support from secondary sources. Further, the author relies on domestic penal codes 
and other provisions, as well as some domestic case law in the analysis of how corporate 
criminal liability is pursued at the domestic level for involvement in international grave crimes. 
Secondary sources, namely scholarly articles and books, as well as court submissions, and 
reports from non-governmental organizations (herein “NGOs”) are used to contextualize and 
exemplify those issues, as well as support the analysis of these primary sources. However, 
more “legal weight” is given to the primary sources.11 
 
9 Carrie Williams, ‘Research Methods’ (2007) Journal of Business & Economic Research, Vol. 5, No. 3, p.67. 
10 Ibid, p.65. 
11 Stephen Elias, Legal Research: How to Find & Understand the Law (Nolo 2015), p.22. 
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Case studies of individual countries, France and the United States are done in order to identify 
common themes and best practices, as well as overlying issues in addressing corporate criminal 
liability in domestic settings. France was selected due to its track record with international law 
and human rights, and its breadth of ongoing cases relating to business and human rights. The 
United States was selected due to the its status as home to some of the world’s biggest 
corporations, as well as to serve as a comparator due to its reputation for not going along with 
international legal customs, notably not ratifying the notably the Rome Statute as well as the 
majority of international human rights treaties. 
A specific situation involving a French bank, BNP Paribas, composed of one case from the 
United States and two criminal complaints in France is used to illustrate not only the disjointed 
nature of domestic systems, but how they can be used in conjunction to pursue corporate 
criminal liability for international core crimes.  
In addition, the author interviewed 5 professionals in the field of corporate accountability in 
order to gain a greater understanding of context as well as practical applications. These 
interviewees were selected based on their expertise, experience, research focus, and 
accessibility. Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured fashion and all conducted 
remotely via Skype, WhatsApp, Facetime, or Zoom. All interviewees remain anonymous for 
their privacy, but retain their titles absent from their prospective organizations or institutions. 
Quotes from these interviews are utilized to support or clarify theories and analysis addressed 
in this paper.  
 
2.1 Limitations of study  
Because of the broad nature of corporate accountability for international crimes, there are many 
different approaches to it. However, this paper will focus on criminal liability for corporations 
for violations of the “core” international crimes.12 Moreover, because corporate criminal 
liability sits within the realm of business and human rights, some of the mechanisms discussed 
focus on different types of human rights abuses that can be perpetrated by corporations, such 
 
12 Core crimes are as set out by the Rome Statute.  
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as violations of labor rights. Though these are important issues, this paper limits its scope to 
the types of human rights abuses that fall within the core international crimes, which are 
detailed in the following section. In addition, though corporate accountability can be pursued 
through the prosecution of the management or directors of a corporation, this paper primarily 
focuses on the prosecution corporations as a legal person. Moreover, the difference between 
civil and criminal corporate liability will be addressed later in this paper, but the concentration 
of this paper is on corporate criminal liability.  
Moreover, this thesis is very European and North American-centric, concentrating primarily 
on how countries and corporations from the Global North operate in and govern this field. 
There are several interesting case studies on corporate accountability from the Global South, 
such as in Argentina, that are not addressed in this paper.  
In addition, though many of these atrocity crimes are linked to economic crimes (money 
laundering, terrorist financing, etc.), the focus of this paper is not on these economic crimes, 
but rather specifically on atrocities and the perpetration of the core crimes by corporations. 
Notably, some economic crimes may serve as complicity to a core international crime.  
Moreover, the analysis presented in this paper is based upon the author’s own understanding 
of the topics as well as personal opinions, supported by the work of other scholars in the field, 
and is not meant to be represented of the entire field of corporate criminal liability, but provide 
for a comprehensive understanding of the scope of the corporate accountability and highlight 
the massive issues that are present within it. 
 
2.2 Key definitions 
For the purposes of this paper the author focuses on human rights as defined by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, as well as supporting UN treaties and conventions. However, 
because human rights include such a wide spectrum of rights, the author will be focusing on 
those falling within the scope of crimes discussed in the Rome Statute: genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Notably, the crime of aggression is not 
entirely discussed in this paper, though a similar “crimes against peace” is addressed in the 
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context of the Nuremberg Trials.  Although human rights do encompass relevant rights in the 
context of business involvement, such as freedom of association and freedom from 
discrimination, these will not be the main focus of the paper. For the purposes of this paper, 
human rights will be limited to the crimes mentioned under the Rome Statute, although the 
necessity of “widespread or systematic” may not be met.  
The international “core” crimes referred to are those outlined in the Rome Statute in Articles 6 
through 8.13 
“Atrocity crimes” and “international core crimes/core international crimes” for the purposes of 
this paper are used interchangeably.  
 
 
13 Please note some portions of the articles have been omitted for length reasons. “Article 6 Genocide For the 
purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Article 7 Crimes against 
humanity 1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge 
of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international 
law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any 
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity 
on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are 
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this 
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime 
of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury 
to body or to mental or physical health. Article 8 War Crimes For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means: 
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against 
persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: (i) Wilful killing; (ii) 
Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; (iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious 
injury to body or health; (iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; (v) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to 
serve in the forces of a hostile Power; (vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the 
rights of fair and regular trial; vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement; (viii) Taking of 
hostages... (b) (viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian 
population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the 
occupied territory within or outside this territory…(xvi) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault; 
(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons…Article 8bis Crime of Aggression… the planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.” Rome Statute, Articles 6-8bis. 
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2.3 Anticipated Findings  
The author expected to find that international law through potentially embryonic in scope, 
paired with the current use of domestic laws will allow for means of prosecuting corporations 
on whole for involvement in international crimes, rather than just the individual. Going into 
this research, the author believed these linkages though small on their own, when presented all 
together, would be enough to at least spark larger conversation on what can be done on the 
international level to prevent and deter corporations from engaging in mass atrocities and 
human rights violations. The author expected to find that the majority of legal scholars did not 
believe corporations can be prosecuted for violations of international criminal law because they 
are not natural persons, however, the author approached this research with the aim to compile 
the findings in such a way that opens the door to this conversation. Notably, the author was 
surprised to find that many legal scholars are pushing for legal persons to be prosecuted for 
their involvement in international crimes though their suggested paths differed.  
 
2.4 Structure of paper 
This paper will be divided into six substantive chapters: background, international soft law, 
international customs and tribunals, and domestic approaches, recommendations and a 
conclusion. Following a brief background, the author begins with an analysis of the soft law 
mechanisms surrounding the governance of corporations and businesses with respect to human 
rights. This is done through an analysis of 3 major ongoing soft law mechanisms: the OECD 
Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, the UN Global Compact, and the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, followed by a mention of the failed UN Norms the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights as well as the upcoming UN Draft Treaty on Business and Human Rights.  
The following section addresses international customs and tribunals operating in this space. 
The chapter starts with an explanation of applicable concepts, and then dives into analysis of 
corporate accountability as presented the three tribunals: the IMT, ICC, and STL. All three are 
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analyzed in order to grasp the scope by which corporate criminal liability is being addressed at 
the international criminal level.  
The next section addresses how domestic  systems deal with corporate criminal liability for the  
international core crimes, looking specifically into the practices of France and the United 
States. This chapter closes with a look into the corporate accountability approaches by both the 
U.S. and France in light of a specific situation, the French bank BNP Paribas and its 
involvement in Sudan.  
This is then followed with recommendations on how to address concerns that were raised 
within this thesis, and a concluding chapter.  
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3. Background – Corporations, Crimes, and CSR 
3.1 Forms of Involvement  
According to scholars there are several ways a corporation can be involved, or otherwise play 
a role, in the commission of core international crimes, but the most common fall within its 
relationship with the government, such as supporting a military regime or dictatorship, and its 
relationship with affected populations, like when conducting business in war zones or conflict 
affected areas.14 While the burden to protect its citizens falls upon states, corporate 
involvement in many circumstances enhances the problems at hand. While the state or another 
armed group in control may be the main perpetrators of large-scale atrocities, corporations and 
other business entities may be complicit or involved indirectly, or even directly, depending on 
the circumstances.  
With regards to the relationship with the government, corporations may act to support a state’s 
atrocities through profiting from state-sponsored violence.15 This would be, for example, when 
a company enables, “aids and abets”, and profits from an attack. An instance of this is as the 
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum case, where it was alleged that Royal Dutch Shell worked in 
conjunction with the Nigerian military, through monetary support and other means,  to commit 
human rights abuses and crimes against humanity in response to the opposition surrounding 
Shell’s operations.16  Another example of this would be how businesses in South Africa played 
a crucial role to “’design and implement’ apartheid”.17 Additionally, corporations can facilitate 
atrocities through providing the means necessary to do so.18 This is seen in many different 
ways, such as German industrialists aiding and/or facilitating the commission of crimes by the 
Nazis, through providing chemical gas, for example. But also, in more recent cases such as the 
two Dutch cases of businessmen Frans van Anraat and Guus Kouwenhoven who were 
convicted for facilitating war crimes and crimes against humanity because they provided 
 
14 Steven Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsiblitiy’ (2001) The Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 111, No. 3, pp. 443-545, (‘Ratner 2001’), pp.497-511; Wolfgang Kaleck and Miriam Saage-Maaß, 
‘Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimes: The Status Quo 
and Its Challenges’ (2010)  Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 699–724, (‘Kaleck and 
Saage-Maaß 2010’), pp.703-708. 
15 Kaleck and Saage-Maaß 2010, p.703. 
16 Kaleck and Saage-Maaß 2010, p.703; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (18 March 2009) (S.D.N.Y.) 96 Civ. 
8386 (KMW) (HBP), 01 Civ. 1909 (KMW) (HBP), 02 Civ. 7618 (KMW) (HBP). 
17 Ratner 2001, p.503. 
18 Kaleck and Saage-Maaß 2010, p.704. 
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chemicals and weapons with knowledge that they would be used to commit abuses, in both 
Iraq and Liberia respectively.19 This can also be arguably applied to banks for facilitating 
transactions needed to buy weapons or access foreign markets, which will be addressed later 
in this paper.   
Additionally, corporations can become involved in violations of the international core crimes 
through operating in conflict-affected areas or war zones, by supporting one side of the conflict 
or profiting off the conflict in general.20 This can be seen in the extraction industries, where 
operating in conflict zones yields the potential for higher profits because of greater risks 
assumed by the company. Operating in these regions requires an extensive amount of due 
diligence prior to entry in order to ensure that businesses are not contributing to abuses. An 
example of this is the case of Lafarge, which will be discussed in a later, but where ultimately 
a French company operating in Syria has been accused of making payments to the Islamic State 
(herein “IS”) in order to continue production in the region. Moreover, companies can support 
states through their provision of intelligence and military services in an armed conflict 
setting.21 This can be done when a technology company gives geolocation data of dissidents to 
an authoritarian government, under duress or otherwise. Or when a private firm facilitates the 
monitoring of specified targets for governments with questionable or even poor human rights 
records, such as with the NSO Group and Saudi Arabia.22   
The ways by which corporations can contribute to egregious abuses are numerous and range 
from direct perpetration to facilitation (either intentionally or through negligence or 
recklessness) in the case of international core crimes. Because of this, corporations must be 
extremely wary, especially when doing business in areas affected by war, conflict, or 
dictatorships. Typically, businesses have policies in place in order to prevent engaging in this 
 
19 Kaleck and Saage-Maaß 2010, p.704; Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Accountability for Corporate Human Rights Abuses: 
Lessons from the Possible Exercise of Dutch National Criminal Jurisdiction over Multinational Corporations’ 
(2017) Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2017, pp.1–24., p.6; The Public Prosecutor v. Guus Kouwenhoven 
(2017) 20/001906-10 English translation; Public Prosecutor v. Frans Cornelis Adrianus van Anraat (2005) 
09/751003-04. 
20 Kaleck and Saage Maaß 2010, p.707. 
21 Ibid, p.709. 
22 For more information see: Amnesty International, ‘Amnesty International Among Targets of NSO-Powered 
Campaign’ (Amnesty International, 1 Aug. 2018) <www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2018/08/amnesty-
international-among-targets-of-nso-powered-campaign/> accessed 5 July 2020; Marczak, Bill, et al. ‘HIDE 
AND SEEK Tracking NSO Group’s Pegasus Spyware to Operations in 45 Countries’ (The Citizen Lab, 18 
September 2018)  <citizenlab.ca/2018/09/hide-and-seek-tracking-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-to-operations-in-
45-countries/> accessed 5 July 2020.  
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kind of conduct, as well as other human rights abuses, which is typically presented under the 
framework of corporate social responsibility.  
 
3.2 Corporate Social Responsibility  
In order to understand what prevents businesses from contributing to human rights abuses it is 
helpful to turn to the principles and frameworks governing business, in particular, corporate 
social responsibility (herein “CSR”). In the context of any discussion of business and human 
rights, undoubtedly the concept of corporate social responsibly comes up. CSR refers to the 
concept of the duty and responsibility a corporation holds extends beyond its shareholders and 
into the community in which it operates. CSR contradicts the view that businesses have a duty 
only to their shareholders, and usually manifests differently in each company, with some basic 
similarities stemming from international guidelines. Often confused with philanthropic efforts, 
one scholar comments that, “CSR is not philanthropy, contributing gifts from profits, but 
involves the exercise of social responsibility in how profits are made.”23 While there are 
different paradigms by which one can approach CSR24 the general idea is that corporations 
must take into account environmental and social concerns that stem from their own 
initiatives.25 Almost every major company has a CSR policy, and some go as far as to include 
elements of CSR into their mission statements and core values.26 CSR is the main form of 
accepted regulation on business in terms of social matters. 
Most corporations do not set out with the intention to commit large scale human rights abuses. 
They, following the capitalist model, set out to generate profit. This profit area however is 
where the violations can take place, whether it be through exploitation of cheap labor in conflict 
ridden countries, engaging in extraction without environmental or safety concerns, or 
 
23 Doreen McBarnet, ‘The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, 
Through Law, For Law’ (2007) <https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-
materials/McBarnet-New-Corporate-Accountability.doc> accessed 31 July 2020.  
24 See Doreen Lustig, ‘Three Paradigms of Corporate Responsibility in International Law: The Kiobel Moment’ 
(2014) Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 593–614., pp.594-602. 
25 See UNIDO’s definition on CSR. United Nations Industrial Development Organization, ‘What Is CSR?’ 
(UNIDO) <www.unido.org/our-focus/advancing-economic-competitiveness/competitive-trade-capacities-and-
corporate-responsibility/corporate-social-responsibility-market-integration/what-csr> accessed 5 July 2020. 
26 Microsoft, for example, has CSR as one of its “core values”. Microsoft, ‘Our Values’ 
<www.microsoft.com/en-us/about/values> accessed 26 April  2020. 
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supplying weapons to the highest bidder. In pursuit of profit, without proper regulation and 
oversight, violations can take place.  
The idea of CSR is not new, going back centuries to the moral implications of a corporation 
present in Canon law.27 The idea of a “corporate soul” emerged in the 19th century, followed 
by the concept that corporations can, and should, act as a “good citizen.”28 However, CSR as 
we know it goes back to the early 20th century when businesses began public relations 
campaigns seeking to get away from the image of a “soulless corporation” and aid in their fight 
against big government and its regulations.29 Corporations realized that in order to advocate on 
behalf of what they wanted, they needed to put a face to the name, and present an image to the 
world that would be beneficial on their behalf. As a result, corporations began to create their 
own “distinctive corporate culture” 30 that appeared the way they wanted it to, in order to help 
them achieve their goals with the government but also gain greater customer connections. This 
occurred until the mid-1900s when different approaches to CSR, such as the “Stakeholder 
Approach” and the “Three-Dimensional Model” were introduced.31  
 
3.2.1 Self-Regulation Revolution  
The 1970s rang in the beginning of “private” or “self-regulation revolution,” in which a myriad 
of soft law policies were introduced in order to increase CSR efforts.32 These efforts were often 
 
27 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on 
Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2005) Delaware Corporate Journal of Law, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 767-818., 
pp.772, 780-782. 
28 Grietje Baars, ‘‘It’s Not Me, It’s the Corporation’: the Value of Corporate Accountability in the Global 
Political Economy’ (2016) London Review of International Law, Vol. 0, Issue 0, pp.1-37, (‘Baars 2016’), p.13; 
Roland Marchland, ‘Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in 
American Big Business’ (New York Times Archives, 1998) The Regents of the University of 
California <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/first/m/marchand-corporate.html> accessed 5 
July 2020. 
29 Ibid.   
30 Ibid. 
31 See Table 1. Neelam Jhawar and Shasta Gupta, ‘Understanding CSR- Its History and the Recent 
Developments’ (May 2017) IOSR Journal of Business and Management, Vol. 19, Issue. 05, pp. 105–109 
<http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jbm/papers/Vol19-issue5/Version-6/P190506105109.pdf> accessed 5 July 
2020, p.106.  
32 Baars 2016, p.16; Leigh A. Payne, and Gabriela Pereira, ‘Corporate Complicity in International Human 
Rights Violations’ (10 August 2016) Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 12, 10, pp. 63–84, 
(‘Payne and Pereira 2016’), p. 67. 
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driven by a partnership between states and business, and were based on the premise that if 
businesses could regulate themselves they would not have to deal with regulation from the 
state. As a result, many soft law mechanisms were created to serve as a sort of pseudo-
regulation upon business. Among the international soft law mechanisms that emerged during 
this time period were the 1974 establishment of the UN Center on Transnational Corporations, 
the 1976 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s Declaration on Decisions 
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises and Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, and  the International Labor Organization’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
the Sullivan Principles on Apartheid all being adopted in 1977.33 Although these efforts were 
in the works, the CSR movement began to really take off in the 1980s and 1990s, stemming 
from increased awareness of corporate complicity in major human rights violations.34 The 
1990s and early 2000s were marked with more soft law policies, including the UN Global 
Compact, the failed UN Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Right, and most prominent, the UN 
Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights, all of which will be addressed in the 
subsequent chapters.  
 
3.2.2  Legalized CSR 
Although the soft law mechanisms surrounding CSR have been widely applauded by states and 
businesses alike, some lawyers, disillusioned with the amount of mechanisms without any 
enforcement options, have supported the idea of “legalized CSR”.35 Underlying this is the is 
the idea of “bring[ing] the state back into the relationship” and going after corporations through 
strategic litigation.36 This means holding corporations accountable for their actions legally, 
 
33 Payne and Pereira 2016, p. 67, fn 1. 
34 Such as multinational companies’ extraction of oil and precious stones and metals leading to human rights 
abuses at the local level, and the recognition of labor exploitation. UN Global Compact and UNOHCHR, 
‘Embedding Human Rights into Business Practice’ (2003) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Embeddingen.pdf> accessed 28 July 2020, pp. 29, 51; Payne 
and Pereira 2016, p.67. 
35 Grietje Baars, ‘Capital, corporate citizenship and legitimacy: The ideological force of ‘corporate crime’ in 
international law’ In Baars, G. and Spicer, A. (eds.), The Corporation: A Critical, Multi-Disciplinary Handbook 
(Cambridge University Press 2017), pp. 419-433, (‘Baars 2017’), p.18.  
36 Baars 2017, p.18. 
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something that cannot be done under self-regulated CSR. Legal advocates of this approach 
seek to “weaponize” CSR through litigation on aspects of CSR that they can actually get 
control over, and this method is being pursued under both domestic criminal and civil laws.37  
Moreover, even more creative efforts are being tested by lawyers to achieve corporate 
accountability. One attorney working in this area spoke of the use of laws that would appear 
“neutral”, or even used in defense of corporations, as helpful tools for promoting and protecting 
human rights: 
“We see that the laws with the most force and that have the most respect, or that are the 
most ingrained in the law, are really commercial laws. So, laws that are not traditionally 
human rights laws: intellectual property, contract, even civil procedure, administrative 
laws, trade law. Those sorts of things that are really straightforward ways to bring 
disputes and claims when those laws are violated. Those are the things that we turn to, 
because the traditional means of holding companies accountable are just really hard to 
use.”38  
This need to use commercial laws to combat corporate facilitation or commission of egregious 
human rights violations shows that the current systems for accountability are failing.  
Baars (2020) argues that self-regulation and corporate accountability make corporations 
stronger through the way that capitalism is set up, and that laws set to govern them are really 
created to facilitate such capitalism, not diminish it.39 This is supported by how some lawyers 
have turned to financial laws in order to go after corporations for violations of human rights, 
because the capitalist system tends to lean more in that direction. Baars goes on to assert that 
legalized CSR leads to  “‘canned morality’ – the dispensing of commodified moral disapproval 
in order to conceal the corporate structure and its broader effects on society and the natural 
environment.”40 When a corporation commits an egregious act, it is able to pay off (settle) with 
victims and the “liability is socialized and the corporation legitimized.”41 In this perspective, 
through committing abuses the corporation gains greater power because their actions have been 
 
37 Baars 2017, pp. 2,18. 
38 See Annex 2 for list of questions and details. Personal Interview, Conducted on Zoom, 3 April 2020.  
39 Grietje Baars, ‘The Limits of Law: Why ‘corporate accountability will not change the corporation’ 
(Transnational Institute, 29 January 2020) <https://www.tni.org/en/publication/the-limits-of-law> accessed 5 
July 2020, (‘Baars 2020’), p.1.  
40 Baars 2020, p.10. 
41 Ibid.  
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legitimized and a price set for committing such offenses. This can lead to corporations being 
able to calculate the risks of doing business and then adjust this for whatever may happen in 
terms of a nonbinding CSR policy.  In unstable or conflict-affected areas this could allow for 
businesses to assess the cost-benefit of engaging with groups committing crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, or genocide. Such type of calculations could be seen as analogous to the 
type of assessment that underlie the 1978 Ford Pinto scandal—where Ford Motors, despite 
knowing defections with its Ford Pinto model, assessed that it was more cost-effective to pay 
settlements from individual law suits when a death or injuries occurred, rather than pay to fix 
all the models.42 This happened with Ford, arguably the most prominent car manufacturer in 
the United States, and while this did not amount to one of the core crimes discussed in this 
paper, it shows that unless there is careful regulation this cost-benefit analysis that prioritizes 
profits over human life can occur.  
While legalized CSR may give corporations more power, the author asserts that if paired with 
the right sort of enforcement mechanisms, legalized CSR can be a powerful tool for 
accountability. 
 
3.3 Background Conclusion  
CSR serves as a base layer for businesses to act more responsibly. However, CSR is also rooted 
in avoiding state-mandated regulation, and as such companies are able to put in place their own 
weak policies rather than something substantive. While corporations are quick to boast about 
their CSR operations and so called “successes,” the same companies are often caught in 
scandals for committing or contributing to core international crimes.43 CSR serving as a 
foundation, and further backed by the soft law mechanisms are insufficient for achieving true 
corporate accountability.  
 
42 American Museum of Tort Law, ‘Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company, 1981’ 
<https://www.tortmuseum.org/ford-pinto/> accessed 28 July 2020.  
43 See for example, Section 6.3 and BNP Paribas, ‘BNP Paribas recognised in Euromoney Western Europe 
Regional & Country Awards for Excellence’ (17 July 2020) <https://group.bnpparibas/en/news/bnp-paribas-
recognised-euromoney-western-europe-regional-country-awards-excellence> accessed 28 July 2020. 
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4. International (Soft) Law 
4.1 Soft Law Mechanisms Analyzed  
Throughout the literature on CSR, and business and human rights in general, there are 
references to three specific international initiatives which govern how states and businesses 
interact with human rights, and work to prevent corporate involvement in atrocities. These 
initiatives stem from traditional practices of CSR, and are generally accepted by businesses 
and states alike being that they are largely voluntary and similar to self-regulation present in 
CSR. Though all of these initiatives function as soft law mechanisms with no binding impact, 
they are important as there are currently no treaties in this sector that have binding implications. 
In the section below the author analyses the three main initiatives: the OECD Guidelines on 
Multinational Enterprises, the UN Global Compact, and the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, as well as some regional initiatives, and draws a comparison 
between one failed initiative, the UN Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, and one upcoming 
treaty. 
 
4.1.1 OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises 
The OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (herein “GME”) were established in 1976 
(updated in 2011) and created with the intent to be followed by both states and enterprises 
operating within its member states as well as additional states who wished to adhere.44 Like 
other guidelines that followed it, the GME are not binding for enterprises, but are a set of 
voluntary principles for enterprises and states to abide by. However, the GME are binding for 
states, who must work to ensure their implementation, which means recommending the 
guidelines to the state’s enterprises.45 The GME asserts that enterprises should do a variety of 
things ranging from “respect[ing] the internationally recognized human rights of those affected 
 
44 Currently, there are 34 OECD members and 11 non-member countries which adhere to the GME. Roel 
Nieuwenkamp, ‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct,’ 
(2013) Dovenschmidt Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 171–175, (‘Nieuwenkamp  2013’), p.172.  
45 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, 
(27 June 2000), (‘OECD GME’) p.13, para.1; p.18, para.11.  
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by their activities” to carrying out due diligence risk assessments, and “seek[ing] to prevent or 
mitigate an adverse impact…directly linked to their operations”.46 In addition, the GME 
provides for a chapter specifically on human rights which reaffirms the above commitments, 
but also adds that enterprises should, “Provide for or co-operate through legitimate processes 
in the remediation of adverse human rights impacts where they identify that they have caused 
or contributed to these impacts.”47 This is significant because it actually calls upon enterprises 
to participate in remediation for any wrongs that it contributes to or causes within the course 
of its operations. The GME also created a system of National Contact Points (herein “NCP”), 
for each member state in order to serve a system of accountability, provide for information 
regarding the guidelines, and most importantly, handle “specific instances”.48 
Over time the GME have been revamped, providing a trend towards enforcement and pressure 
for noncompliance. “Specific instances” are how the GME refers to complaints made to an 
NCP regarding its implementation. While the GME are not binding, the system related to 
specific instances has allowed for successful campaigns against businesses in recent years. 
Because the GME is not binding, it cannot provide for any judicial means of resolving conflict 
with regards to its implementation, however, the specific instances brought before an NCP can 
lead to mediation, followed by a publicly available statement by the NCP on the results. This 
is one way to publicly pressure enterprises to abide by the what would be otherwise soft law. 
For example, in 2009 a complaint to the United Kingdom’s NCP was launched against 
Vedanta, a British mining company operating in India; the complaint alleged that Vedanta was 
not complying with the GME.49 Vedanta refused to engage in mediation, so in the NCP’s final 
statement it upheld all three allegations listed in the complaint, showing three individual 
examples of a failure to comply with the GME.50 Although this final statement had no power 
with regards to criminal liability in itself, the repercussions that ensued as a result of it were 
extremely impactful upon Vedanta. The NCP’s final statement was used by NGOs to persuade 
members of the financial sector to pull out its investments from Vedanta.51 So even though 
there are no legal consequences for failure to abide by the GME, companies can be publicly 
 
46 OECD GME, pp.19-20. 
47 OECD GME, p.31, para.6. 
48 OECD GME, pp.71-72. 
49 Nieuwenkamp 2013, p.171. 
50 Rowland Bass, et al., ‘Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises Complaint from Survival International against Vedanta Resources Plc’ (25 September 
2009) UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises 
<https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/43884129.pdf> accessed 5 July 2020, pp.3-4. 
51 Nieuwenkamp 2013, p.171. 
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shamed and have resources and investments cut off as a result. Moreover, a country’s NCP can 
advocate for penalties if an enterprise fails to comply with the GME.52  As such, though the 
GME are not legally enforceable, practically they can have some real impact if the NCP makes 
an effort to do so. This is relevant in countries that are weary of corporate contribution to 
human rights abuses and atrocity crimes, as well as countries who approach this from a host 
state53 point of view. However, this may not be the case in all countries. Moreover, as with any 
international agreement, the GME only applies to those who have signed onto it, being a 
minority of the world’s countries, with 34 OECD members and 11 non-members. Notably, 
85% of all global trade and foreign investment fall within the scope of the GME54 so there are 
great opportunities for the NCP “specific instance” complaint mechanism to be used and with 
that a campaign of public pressure. However, legally speaking the GME does little to hold 
corporations accountable. Moreover, the type of power the NCP will depend upon where the 
individual NCP is housed within its government. For example, the United Kingdom’s NCP is 
housed within the Department for International Trade,55 whereas other countries may choose 
to house their NCPs within the justice or human rights departments. Depending on where the 
NCPs are housed, the NCP will have greater (or less) access to important resources and 
understanding of the GME in relation to the protection of human rights. This will impact the 
work of the NCP and the veracity by which they will or will not take specific instance claims 
seriously.  
 
4.1.2 UN Global Compact 
The UN Global Compact was launched in 2000, as an initiative of commitments from 
companies to work towards its 10 Principles, and later, the implementation of the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals (herein “SDGs”). The UN Global Compact is a voluntary 
initiative that companies can sign onto with little requirements attached, and as such there are 
 
52 John Ruggie, ‘The evolving regulatory ecosystem of business and human rights’ in OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises: A Glass Half Full, (2018), pp.19-23, <https://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/OECD-
Guidelines-for-MNEs-A-Glass-Half-Full.pdf>, accessed 5 July 2020, p.21. 
53 See Section 6.2 for a detailed explanation of this concept.  
54 Nieuwenkamp 2013, p.172. 
55 Gov.UK, ‘UK National Contact Point: Part of the Department of International Trade’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-national-contact-point> accessed 28 July 2020.  
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currently 10,435 companies, spanning 166 countries that have signed onto it.56 Of the 10 
Principles of the UN Global Compact, there are four particularly relevant to this paper, with 
two concerning human rights and two concerning relevant labor rights. The first two: 
“Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human 
rights” and “Businesses should make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses”57 
are pretty straightforward and assert a positive obligation for businesses, rather than states. 
This is important because it puts the burden on companies to uphold basic human rights 
throughout their work, and ensure they are not complicit in human rights abuses. The UN 
Global Compact offers further suggestions on how to meet these principles, such as conducting 
human rights assessments and awareness raising of potential human rights risk factors within 
the company’s sector.58 With reference to labor, the principles relevant to this paper are 
Principles 4 and 5, “the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labor” and “the 
effective abolition of child labour”.59 These are strong and meaningful principles, and the 
Global Compact additionally provides for strategies that would prevent companies from 
engaging in this type of behavior.  
In terms of preventing businesses from committing abuses, be it in the form of human rights 
abuses or violations of international criminal law, the Global Compact is largely ineffective. 
Although the Global Compact is a forum for companies to come together to aim towards 
creating a more sustainable business environment, it functions largely for appearances. In order 
for a company to join, it must only “express commitment” to the 10 Principles and “express 
commitment” to “take action in support” of the SDGs.60 Members who do not abide by the 
Principles are not expelled from membership either, expulsion comes as a result of not 
completing a “Communication of Progress” report during a designated time period.61 For 
example, even companies who are accused of complicity in war crimes and crimes against 
 
56 UN Global Compact, ‘Homepage: UN Global Compact’ <www.unglobalcompact.org/> accessed 26 April 
2020. 
57 UN Global Compact, ‘The Ten Principles’ <www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles> 
accessed 26 April 2020.  
58 UN Global Compact, ‘Principle 2: Human Rights’ <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-
gc/mission/principles/principle-2> accessed 26 April 2020.  
59 UN Global Compact, ‘The Ten Principles’ <www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles> 
accessed 26 April 2020. 
60 UN Global Compact, ‘Online Application Guidelines – Business Applicants’ 
<https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/docs/how_to_participate_doc%2FOnline_Application_Guideline_Busin
ess.pdf> accessed 5 July 2020. 
61 UN Global Compact, ‘Communication on Progress: UN Global Compact’ 
<www.unglobalcompact.org/participation/report/cop> accessed 26 April 2020.  
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humanity, such as BNP Paribas, are still part of the UN Global Compact and not placed on any 
sort of “watch list”. Even if a company fails at one or more of the Principles, it can still be a 
member of the Global Compact, it would just be designated as a “GC Learner,” which is all 
based on the company’s self-assessment.62 Membership of the UN Global Compact is effort 
based, with effort being to complete an annual submission. The UN Global Compact, though 
serving as a forum for businesses to come together to discuss their effect on the world’s issues, 
practically does nothing to hold corporations accountable for any abuses they committed. 
Moreover, it allows businesses to mark themselves as members even without compliance to its 
10 basic principles. On one hand the UN Global Compact is a good gesture towards limiting 
business involvement in atrocities, through providing clear principles and suggestions on how 
to achieve them, but on the other hand because there are no downsides of noncompliance, there 
is no real incentive for businesses to do so, and as such it can act as a cover by which businesses 
can boost their image, whilst doing nothing in reality.  
While serving no actual accountability purpose, like other soft law mechanisms, the Global 
Compact does make an effort towards progress in sustainable business. One of the greatest 
issues the Global Compact faces is the vast amount of aims it takes on, ranging from human 
rights to labor to the environment to anti-corruption. Though the author is highly critical of the 
UN Global Compact, it does have ambitions to do good work and normalize human rights and 
sustainability for businesses, but in terms of achieving corporate accountability the Global 
Compacts has no real power to create the changes it is are encouraging.  
 
4.1.3 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights  
In 2011 the UN Commission on Human Rights endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights (herein “UNGP”), also known as the “Guiding Principles” or “Ruggie 
Principles,” written by UN Special Representative to the Secretary General on human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie.63 The UNGP 
establish a state duty to protect human rights, a corporate responsibility to respect human rights, 
 
62 Ibid.  
63 Payne and Pereira 2016, p.67. 
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and outlines access to remedies.64 However, all of these are aspirational, and the UNGP did 
not establish anything new with regards to law. The UNGP received “widespread support” 
from businesses and states because of their voluntary nature and weak enforcement 
mechanisms.65 The UNGP explicitly state that nothing included creates new international law 
obligations, nor does it limit or undermine obligations by a State to existing international law 
or obligations created by a State.66 Essentially, the UNGP offer some suggestions of what could 
be beneficial to society if pursued, but in the same note acknowledges that they are not hard 
law, so more or less on behalf of businesses and states could be done. As such they are 
appropriately referred to as “guidelines”.  
Because the UNGP do not require any explicit actions on behalf of corporations, they have the 
potential to act as a sort of “cover” by which corporations can continue committing abuses.67 
The cover can be provided through the UNGP stating that businesses should create a statement 
expressing their “commitment” to the “responsibility to respect human rights.”68 Although 
creating such a statement will force businesses to have to think about their responsibility with 
regards to human rights, the statement can easily function as a “cop out” when a violation is 
committed, with businesses being able to point to statement saying that they are working on 
this type of behavior or making efforts to combat human rights abuses, while committing them 
themselves. Moreover, in some countries, such as the US, when deciding to prosecute a 
company, authorities look to see if there is some sort of compliance policy which would factor 
in as a mitigating circumstance.69 As such, it is in the company’s best interest to develop these 
plans, regardless of how they actually play out in practice.  
The UNGP follow the traditional paradigm of state protection, calling upon states to protect its 
people from abuses, rather than emphasizing that corporations should not be committing abuses 
in the first place. The majority of principles begin with “states should,” putting the burden of 
responsibility on states rather than businesses. Moreover, the prevalence of the word “should” 
is excessive, occurring 115 times throughout 35 pages of text, even though “should” has no 
binding significance. Should is the equivalent of a suggestion. This continues with the use of 
 
64 See UNOHCHR, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (2011) HR/PUB/11/04, (‘UN Guiding 
Principles’), p.1. 
65 Payne and Pereira 2016, p.67. 
66 UN Guiding Principles, p.1.  
67 Payne and Pereira 2016, p. 68. 
68 See Article 16. UN Guiding Principles, p.16. 
69 See USAM §§ 9-28.300 Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations (US), for example. 
 23 
the word “must” when referring to some responsibilities of states: “States must protect against 
human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business 
enterprises”70 and “As part of their duty to protect against business-related human rights abuse, 
States must take appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial, administrative, legislative or 
other appropriate means, that when such abuses occur within their territory and/or jurisdiction 
those affected have access to effective remedy.”71 The commanding term “must” is not used 
when describing business responsibilities. This aligns with the traditional understanding of 
states, as the State would have the responsibility to not commit grave crimes, where the State 
would have the power to implement regulatory control over corporations. But as the point of 
the principles is to function for businesses and states, it is interesting to highlight that little 
strong language is used in addressing businesses.  The one time “require” is used in the context 
of businesses, it is followed with weaker words:  
“The responsibility to respect human rights requires that business enterprises: (a) Avoid 
causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, 
and address such impacts when they occur; (b) Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse 
human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services 
by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.”72 
This provides a false sense of impact, because although the first sentence begins with a 
requirement, the requirement is undermined by the introduction of weaker the phrases “avoid 
causing” and “seek to prevent.” By using the words “must” and “require” when speaking about 
the duties of states but not with businesses undermines the strength of the UNGP– which is the 
whole point, and which is why it was so applauded by states and businesses alike. The UNGP 
largely mirror that of the UN Global Compact, providing weak advice and no enforcement 
mechanisms, only with a greater involvement on behalf of states rather than companies.  
Additionally, the UNGP are written in a way that differentiates between “duty” and 
“responsibility” in terms of states and corporations, with states having duties and businesses 
having responsibilities. 73  There seems to be a split between whether “responsibility” or “duty” 
 
70 Article 1. UN Guiding Principles, p.1. 
71 Article 25. UN Guiding Principles, p.27. 
72 Article 13. UN Guiding Principles, p.14. 
73 See Table of Contents. UN Guiding Principles, p. iii.  
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invokes a greater sense of promise or legal obligation.74 Ruggie himself has stated that the 
difference was only “intended to signal that it differs from legal duties.”75 However, while this 
may have been his intention, scholars argue that the distinction is extremely “confusing” as 
both “responsibility” and “duty” have legal and nonlegal meanings associated with them.76 By 
both philosophical and legal definitions, duties and responsibilities tend to have intermingling 
meanings and can both be exposed to the same (and different) moral or legal consequences.77 
As such Ruggie’s specific diction choice to assign “duty” to states and “responsibility” to 
businesses come under scrutiny. As Wettstein (2015) put it, “By limiting the notion of 
responsibility to the non-legal and that of duty to the legal realm, the SRSG [Ruggie] implies 
that there is no basis in international human rights law from which to derive corporate human 
rights responsibilities.”78 This is fundamentally a problem in achieving corporate criminal 
liability because it implies that there is no legal mechanism to do so, which is refuted by 
scholars and practitioners alike, but especially within the context of atrocity crimes. Other 
scholars argue that the use of the term “responsibility” also allows for discretion79 inherently 
allowing for a weaker application of human rights protections to be undertaken by 
corporations. 
The UNGP do exactly what they intended to: release more soft law guidelines of what states 
and businesses ought to do. However, the reason the UNGP are so disappointing is because of 
the great contrast with the UN Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (herein “Draft 
Norms”) before them, which will be discussed below. The UNGP merely offer suggestions, 
with no concrete regulatory frameworks, monitoring mechanisms, or mentions of victims. And 
while these suggestions are needed, the UNGP offers nothing new – exactly as it says – and 
received much applause. The UNGP are consistently criticized as having no “teeth,”80 and 
 
74 Florian Wettstein, ‘Normativity, Ethics and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: A Critical Assessment’ (2015) Journal of Human Rights Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 162-182 (‘Wettstein 
2015’), p.167. 
75 Ibid, p.167. 
76 Robert McCorquodale, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and International Human Rights Law’ (2009) Journal 
of Business Ethics Vol. 87, Supplement 2: Sphere of Influence/Spheres of Responsibility: Multinational 
Corporations and Human Rights, pp.385-400, p. 393; Wettstein 2015, p.167. 
77 Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press 
1995), pp.772-773. 
78 Wettstein 2015, p.167. 
79 Wettstein 2015, pp.168-169. 
80 Baars 2020, p.4; Nicola Jägers, ‘UN guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making Headway 
Towards Real Corporate Accountability’ (2011) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 29, No. 2, 
pp.159-163., p.163.  
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rightly so. The most comprehensive piece of literature to date regarding human rights and 
businesses has no enforcement mechanism, and because the Principles put the burden on the 
State it allows the opportunity for businesses to conduct operations in a way that endangers 
human rights risk free. But while the author criticizes Ruggie and the UNGP, the UNGP are 
still considered to be the cornerstone of business and human rights, and as Wettstein (2015) 
put it, “One may be critical or sympathetic toward the ‘Ruggie’ process and its results, but one 
cannot but acknowledge the tremendous transformation the debate has undergone since John 
Ruggie took over.”81 
 
4.1.4 Regional Mechanisms in Europe  
Europe generally has been moving towards higher standards of accountability for international 
crimes as committed by corporations. Both the European Union (herein “EU”) and the Council 
of Europe (herein “CoE”) have released legislation towards progressing this idea. In October 
of 2016 the European Parliament adopted a “resolution on Corporate liability for serious human 
rights abuses in third countries” (herein “Resolution”).82 This Resolution acknowledges the 
vast amount of work surrounding this subject, making reference to the UNGP, UN Global 
Compact, GME, the International Labour Organization’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, amongst other mechanisms, and calls 
upon corporations to support and respect human rights. However, being a resolution and not a 
directive or regulation, it has no legal binding power and acts as a gesture more than anything. 
As such the Resolution acts exactly as all the other soft law mechanisms before it, providing 
for support on paper but offering no enforcement mechanisms. It “calls on” the Member States 
and the Commission,  
“to guarantee policy coherence on business and human rights at all levels: within 
different EU institutions, between the institutions, and between the EU and its Member 
States, and in particular in relation to the Union’s trade policy; calls on the Commission 
and Member States to explicitly include the aforementioned principle in all treaties 
 
81 Wettstein 2015, p.163.  
82 European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2016 on corporate liability for serious human rights abuses in 
third countries (25 October 2016) 2015/2315(INI).  
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signed by them, in keeping with international commitments undertaken in relation to 
human rights; notes that this will require intensive cooperation between different 
directorates-general within the Commission and the European External Action 
Service.”83 
It also calls for the adoption of binding instruments by the essentially everyone: all 
international and national bodies, the EU and its member states, and all third countries.84 These 
calls are so important, as well as acknowledging the mechanisms before it. However, it does 
not offer any concrete ways to do the things it calls upon. Unlike other EU legislation, like the 
Conflict Minerals Regulation85 and the EU Timber Regulation,86 this Resolution offers nothing 
new and only echoes the calls of the soft law before it. Its failure to do so demonstrates just 
another instance of international systems failure to actually materialize actions towards 
corporate accountability.   
In addition, in 2016 the CoE Committee of Ministers released a similar “Recommendation on 
human rights and business” (herein “Recommendation”). Though the essence of the document 
is relatively the same as the EU Parliament’s Resolution, it actually offers examples of what 
sort of actions can be taken in order to ensure human rights be protected in business and 
examples of what criminal liability could look like. For example, the Recommendation states 
that member states should enact legislative measures that allow for criminal prosecution of 
businesses for violations of crimes under international law, as well as specific Conventions of 
the Council of Europe.87 This is extremely important because it recognizes the disjointed nature 
of corporate criminal liability – with some member states lacking it completely. Although this 
Recommendation also has no binding power, through providing concrete ways by which 
businesses can start being held liable for corporate accountability, it provides substance to the 
conversation, rather than echoing calls before it.  
 
83 Ibid, para.14. 
84 Ibid, para.15.  
85 Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down 
supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold 
originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas [2017] OJ L 130/1. 
86 Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 
laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market [2010] OJ L 
295/23. 
87 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member States on human rights and business (adopted 2 
March 2016 at the 1249th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies) CM/Rec(2016)3, (‘CoE Recommendation’), 
para.44. 
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In general, the EU and the CoE are making progress towards higher levels of corporate liability 
for international crimes, and these two pieces of legislation demonstrate a willingness to further 
explore how to do so. However, both also call upon their Member States to take matters into 
their own hands through domestic means. The main issue is that through recommendations and 
resolutions, the European Union and CoE have no actual means of doing so and the 
development and implementation of hard law will be essential if the goal is to get uniformity 
across the Europe.  
 
4.1.5 Honorable mention - UN Draft Norms  
While the Draft Norms were not passed, and the UNGP took its place instead, they are 
important to look at because of their stark contrast to the soft law mechanisms that received 
praise. The Draft Norms were especially relevant to the corporate responsibility space because 
they actually had binding aspects,  moving away from the soft law policies seen in the decades 
before. The Draft Norms called upon businesses to:  
“Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, 
respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well 
as national law, including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and other 
vulnerable groups.”88  
This would actually create real obligations by which businesses had to abide by, differing from 
the UNGP which put the burden upon the states. The Draft Norms also included provisions for 
“periodic monitoring and verification” by the UN, domestic, or international mechanisms, as 
well as “adequate reparations” to those who had been affected by a corporation’s who failed to 
comply with the Draft Norms.89 This, in theory at least, would have completely revolutionized 
how businesses assessed their risk of committing or contributing to human rights abuses when 
getting involved in high risk scenarios, because there would be a real mechanism in place to 
 
88 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights (2003) E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (‘Draft Norms’). 
89 Draft Norms, pp.16,18. 
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hold it accountable for its actions. However, the Norms were eventually opposed by both states 
and business stakeholders as it would give corporations the enforceable obligation respect and 
uphold a lengthy list of human rights, as well as consumer rights and environmental 
protections.90 Because of this, the Draft Norms were “abandoned,” never going into effect.91 
The failure to implement the Draft Norms allowed room for the UNGP to take root, and 
furthered the precedent of weak mechanisms governing businesses at the international level.  
 
4.1.6 Moving Forward: Draft Treaty  
In 2014 the UN Human Rights Council established an “open-ended intergovernmental working 
group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human 
rights” with the purpose of creating a binding instrument to regulate business in relation to 
human rights law.92 From this came the open-ended intergovernmental working group (herein 
“OEIGWG”) which has been working on such a treaty and has released a “Draft Treaty” most 
recently dated 16 July 2019.93 The Draft Treaty is completely different than the UNGP or even 
the Draft Norms before that. Like the Draft Norms, the Draft Treaty would also be a legally 
binding instrument. However, unlike the Draft Norms and the UNGP the approach in the Draft 
Treaty is entirely different, putting a heavy focus on the rights of victims.94 For example, this 
Draft Treaty would guarantee victims: 
“the right to fair, effective, prompt and non-discriminatory access to justice and 
adequate, effective and prompt remedies in accordance with this instrument and 
international law. Such remedies shall include, but shall not be limited to: a.) 
 
90 Draft Norms, p.6; Payne and Pereira 2016, p. 67. 
91 Payne and Pereira 2016, p. 67. 
92 Human Rights Council Resolution 26/9, Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights (14 July 2015) 
A/HRC/RES/26/9.  
93 UNHRC, ‘Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights’ 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Pages/IGWGOnTNC.aspx> accessed 5 July 2020.   
94 See UN Draft Treaty. UNHRC, ‘OEIGWG Chairmanship Revised Draft: Legally Binding Instrument to 
Regulate, In International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises’ (16 July 2019) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf> 
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Restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition 
for victims; b.) Environmental remediation and ecological restoration where applicable, 
including covering of expenses for relocation of victims and replacement of community 
facilities.”95 
While the duty of states is referred to later in the Draft, the first substantive article following 
the scope of the treaty focuses entirely on victims.96 When the duties of the states are finally 
mentioned, it is done in relation to victims. In addition, the Draft Treaty guarantees victims 
protection for themselves and their families, the right to bring claims before courts, and access 
to means that will ensure they are effectively able to pursue their claims.97 For comparison, 
both the UNGP and the Draft Norms fail to take victims into account, with the word “victim,” 
occurring only once between the two works. The usage of the word is significant because it 
acknowledges that when businesses commit violations of international human rights and 
international criminal law, victims are created. By focusing on the duties of states or the duties 
of businesses it separates the diction of what happens when abuses are committed from the 
actual abuses, in that real harm is suffered and victims emerge. By starting the treaty off with 
the rights of victims, it shows that at least the working group is serious about addressing the 
issues and seeking protection and justice for victims. However, since this is only a draft there 
is a high likelihood that this diction could be changed before the final proposal, with two 
delegations and international businesses already finding Article 4 “generally problematic.”98 
Another significant article included in the Draft Treaty is Article 7 “Adjudicative Jurisdiction,” 
which expands the jurisdiction under which a victim can pursue potential cases to include:  
“a.) such acts or omissions occurred; or b.) the victims are domiciled; or c.) the natural 
or legal persons alleged to have committed such acts or omissions in the context of 
business activities, including those of a transnational character, are domiciled.”99 
 
95 UN Draft Treaty, Article 4, para.5. 
96 UN Draft Treaty, Article 4.  
97 UN Draft Treaty, Article 4, paras 3, 8, 7.  
98 UNHRC, ‘Report on the fifth session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’ (9 January 2020) A/HRC/43/55, 
para.44. 
99 UN Draft Treaty, Article 7, para.1. 
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This would combat the issue of home state versus host state jurisdiction100 by allowing the 
victim to try to  pursue a case in different jurisdictions. And as such this provision will expand 
that access to remedy for victims who are unable to seek justice due to host state incapability 
and a home state’s refusal. During the fifth session of the OEIGWG there was a “general 
appreciation” for Article 7; however, some delegations and business organizations opposed the 
idea that claimants could “forum shop” for their ideal jurisdiction.101 This is likely because 
they are content with the current system in place, one that makes pursing cases domestically 
difficult. 
Because the Draft Treaty is only a draft it is impossible to speculate as to whether it will be 
successful in its final form not. However, the steps taken so far in the Draft Treaty show much 
more concrete steps towards corporate liability for international crimes. Moreover, the 
approach is also multilateral, allowing for domestic implementation, monitoring, international 
cooperation, and even mentions of an international court.102 If the Draft treaty is passed there 
will be significant strides for accountability of businesses and potentially a decrease in 
business-committed human rights abuses in the future. However, if in further negotiations the 
provisions for enforcement fall through then it will be yet another example of an international 
agreement that does little in practice to uphold what it preaches  
 
4.1.7 Soft Law Conclusion  
Soft law mechanisms seem to dominate the intersection of business and human rights, rooted 
in the beginnings of CSR and self-regulation. After an analysis of empirical data with regards 
to businesses and voluntary agreements on human rights Payne and Pereira (2016) found: “at 
best voluntary principles have done little to diffuse understanding of business obligations under 
international human rights law. At worst, they signal to businesses and states that these 
 
100 For an explanation of this concept see, Section 6.1.2. 
101 UNHRC, ‘Report on the fifth session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’ (9 January 2020) A/HRC/43/55, 
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102 See Article 6 (1), Article 14 (1), Article 11 UN Draft Treaty. See also UNHRC, ‘Report on the fifth session 
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obligations are voluntary, thereby undermining efforts to strengthen global human rights 
protections.”103 As such, the soft law mechanisms, although well meaning, do little to truly 
prohibit businesses from taking part in atrocity crimes. Soft law mechanisms allow for a system 
of “compliance culture” to be achieved at a company, where at each level there are different 
managers responsible, and allowing the potential to take the blame from the most responsible 
and put it on workers much lower down in the chain of command.104 This also applies to 
subcontractors, where the larger, usually Western, company is able to blame grave abuses on 
local subcontractors rather than take on the responsibility for the abuses themselves.  
This being said, these soft law mechanisms are the only regulations in place at the international 
level that truly govern this space. And while other international and more binding treaties can 
arguably be applied to businesses committing grave abuses, they do not carry the same weight 
in creating a corporate liability for grave abuses of human rights and international criminal law.  
  
 
103 Payne and Pereira 2016, p.68. 
104 Baars 2020, p.6.  
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5. International Law: Customs and Tribunals 
There is a long laundry list of conventions, treaties, and declarations created to ensure human 
rights, and protect against and criminalize atrocities. From international law general concepts 
have arisen which are helpful to analyze within the context of corporate criminal liability. Also 
operating in this space are international criminal tribunals, which were created in order to 
address the world’s most grave atrocities. This chapter aims to analyze the customs, laws, and 
precedents present in international criminal law and apply them specifically to corporate 
criminal liability.  
5.1 General Concepts 
5.1.1 Customary International Law  
Customary international law refers to a set of international obligations stemming from accepted 
international practices; it can be “established by showing 1) state practice, and 2) opinio 
juris.”105 Examples of this would be widely accepted practices such as immunity for heads of 
state or the prohibition against torture. Rather than a codified law, customary international law 
refers to a “general practices accepted as law”.106 Currently, corporate criminal liability is not 
a generally accepted practice.107 In the United States Supreme Court Case, Sosa v. Alvarez,  the 
Court found that "that the relatively few international law treaties that impose particular 
obligations on corporations do not establish corporate liability as a 'specific, universal, and 
obligatory' norm of customary international law."108 However, a study commissioned by the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (herein “UNHCHR”), found that most countries 
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 33 
seem to “recognise the possibility of corporate criminal responsibility,”109 and this was used 
by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to rule that there was a trend toward corporate liability in 
customary international law.110 But the diction in the study commissioned by the UNHCHR 
alone seems to exemplify the current problem with corporate criminal responsibility at the 
international level, in that it may be recognized but not to the point where the concept has 
gained uniform acceptance or customary status. 
While not widely accepted as part of customary international law, corporate criminal liability  
has been recognized in some international tribunal judgements, which are detailed below.111 
 
5.1.2 Civil vs. Criminal Liability 
In pursuing corporate accountability, there are two legal routes, through civil law (tort law) 
and through criminal law. Although the majority of this paper focuses on the criminal law 
aspects, the civil law route is extremely important in this realm because there are much more 
cases of success for plaintiffs.  
In terms of victims, civil and criminal liability notably have very different impacts. In a civil 
case, victims can sue a corporation for damages that they have experienced as the result of the 
corporation’s actions. Often in civil cases the victims are able to win a larger amount of 
compensation than they would as a result of restitution granted in a criminal case, especially 
in the United States. However, because of the financial resources of corporations, a civil case 
in which damages are granted may not be enough to create systemic changes within an industry. 
This is where criminal liability has its benefits. The stigma of being found criminally 
responsible for atrocity crimes, in addition to any criminal penalties imposed can have a greater 
impact for the corporate industry as a whole.  
 
109 See as used in the Appeals Panel decision for Contempt case at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Al Jadeed 
S.A.L. & Ms Khayat (Contempt Appeal) (2014) STL-14-05/PT/AP/ARI26.1, para.49; Zerk, Jennifer, ‘Corporate 
liability for gross human rights abuses: Towards a fairer and more effective system of domestic law remedies’ 
(2013), A report prepared for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, p.32. 
110 See section on 5.2.4 on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon below for greater explanation. Al Jadeed S.A.L. & 
Ms Khayat (Contempt Appeal) (2014) STL-14-05/PT/AP/ARI26.1, para.49. 
111 See Section 5.2 on International Tribunals. 
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However, though criminal liability may be more ideal in establishing deterrence and creating 
impacts throughout an industry, it is far harder to achieve. As with all criminal law, intent is 
crucial in assessing whether a party is guilty or not. However, the extent of intent or knowledge 
required to demonstrate criminal liability in corporate criminal cases varies greatly on a country 
by country basis. For example, Germany and the Netherlands do not require intent for an 
accomplice to be guilty, it could be enough that they possessed knowledge, while the U.S. 
requires “shared intent” with the main perpetrator.112 
As for which approach could be the most effective in fighting corporate impunity, it is hard to 
say as both approaches contain their benefits and drawbacks. One PhD researcher on this topic 
explained it: 
“On the one hand I think civil responsibility is more available in most jurisdictions, and 
it is easier to achieve. It has a lower burden of proof, a lower standard of getting 
liability. But conversely, criminal law is not available everywhere but definitely 
stronger. I think you see this with the two French cases right now: the Lafarge and the 
BNP Paribas case. And it is so clear if you read the press releases and things coming 
out of BNP and Lafarge, how important it is to them to not be labeled as committing 
crimes against humanity, because labels really matter and you don’t get those labels in 
civil liability.”113 
In an industry where image matters, criminal labels – especially the most serious crimes such 
as crimes against humanity and war crimes – can be completely debilitating, whereas a civil 
suit can be more acceptable by the general public.  
 
5.1.3 Mens Rea  
How to go about establishing the mens rea for a corporation has been a large topic of discussion 
within corporate liability circles. The mens rea is extremely difficult to establish for a 
 
112Anita Ramasastry and Robert Thompson, ‘Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector 
Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law, A Survey of Sixteen Countries’ (September 2006) Fafo 
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113 Personal Interview, WhatsApp Video Call, 30 April 2020. See Annex 4 for full list of questions.  
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corporation because it is unclear to what extent it must be present by either the board of 
directors, managers, employees, or if it is present within a corporate culture itself. Moreover, 
the type of mens rea will be assessed as to whether or not the corporation would be a direct 
perpetrator or an accomplice. Generally speaking, case law from the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (herein “ICTR”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (herein “ICTY”) suggests that accomplices to atrocity crimes do not have to have 
the same level of intent as the main perpetrator, but knowledge of it.114 This is important 
because it would lower the burden of proof if a corporate case were to be brought forward and 
make criminal cases with corporate actors more like that of civil cases, in which the level of 
intent does not have to be as high in order to get a guilty verdict. However, it is unclear if this 
same approach would apply to legal persons rather than natural persons because there has been 
no established case law. Some scholars have also suggested the doctrine of command or 
superior responsibility (according to which superiors can be held culpable for the conduct of 
their subordinates even with only knowledge of such conduct) should to apply in a corporate 
context as well.115 At domestic levels, the standard of mens rea required for corporations tends 
to differ immensely and this may have an impact on the on how international courts will 
approach this. 
 
5.1.4 Individual Criminal Liability 
At the international level, the norm for pursing claims against perpetrators of atrocity crimes 
is individual criminal liability. This is the concept present in international criminal law taking 
root from the Nuremberg Trials and appearing in the statutes of the ICTR and ICTY, as well 
as the Rome Statute, aimed at holding those most responsible accountable.116 During the 
Nuremberg Trials, organizations were pursued,117 but ultimately individual criminal liability 
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was chosen to prosecute the corporate actors. Individual criminal liability allows one person to 
be held liable rather than an abstract entity. One scholar, Ratner (2001), entertains the argument 
that the way international criminal liability works in international criminal law can be directly 
transferred to legal entities, with the corporation as the legal entity taking the entirety of the 
responsibility instead of a natural person.118 Under this frame of thought, a corporation could 
be held individually criminally liable as a single legal person, just as a natural person would 
be.119 However, this is not widely accepted, and as such, when the conduct of corporations has 
been the subject of international criminal prosecutions, individual criminal liability for the 
corporations’ leaders has been pursued instead.120 However, other elements present in 
international criminal law can be adopted to serve corporate prosecutions. Collective action 
has been recognized by international law, and even relates to the respective chapeau element(s) 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute.121 While the conduct of a 
single perpetrator can amount to a serious international crime, most often such crimes occur in 
the context of wider criminality by multiple actors working in concert collectively as a group. 
As such the power of the collective must not be underestimated. This is relevant to the 
discussion on corporate criminal liability because of the challenge it poses.   
 
5.1.5 Aiding and Abetting   
While some corporations may have the possibility to serve as direct perpetrators of atrocity 
crimes, most often violations occur as the result of complicity or facilitation. The 
differentiating between a direct perpetrator and an accomplice, accessory, or “aider and 
abettor” is so to distinguish who more culpable and to what extent. The same, in theory, should 
apply for companies. As such, it is helpful to explore the concept of “aiding and abetting” as 
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present in international criminal law, even though currently it has only been utilized within the 
context of individual criminal responsibility. 
In international criminal law, aiding and abetting has two parts: the mens rea and the actus 
reus. The mens rea for aiding and abetting is to have knowledge or awareness of the “essential 
elements” of the crime committed by the main perpetrator, as well as the main perpetrator’s 
state of mind, although the aider and abettor does not need to share the intent with the main 
perpetrator, nor do they need to have knowledge of the exact crime, just an awareness that one 
of a number of crimes would be committed, including the one that actually happened.122 In 
cases of genocide or persecution, which are specific intent crimes, the aider and abettor must 
have knowledge of the main perpetrator’s specific intent.123 Under the ICC, an accomplice 
must hold a high standard of mens rea in that they had knowledge that their actions were “for 
the purpose of facilitating the commission of a crime”.124 The actus reus “consists of practical 
assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration 
of the crime.”125 It is important to note that practical assistance may be done through an act or 
an omission. Within the context of the ICC, an aider and abettor must have a “substantial 
contribution” to the crime,126 but it does not need to meet any specific threshold to establish 
this.127 
While this has not been applied to a legal person at the international criminal level, the same 
levels of actus reus and mens rea should hold true. As mentioned, the issue arises in 
determining how a legal person can have a mens rea. This concept of aiding and abetting, 
however, is extremely relevant for corporate liability because the facilitation of the crime is a 
how the majority of businesses engaging in these kinds of acts would be involved. For example, 
as Mann (2020) put it, “secondary actors, powerful financial institutions and businesses are 
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some of the most responsible contributors to international crimes and serious human rights 
violations, especially when the wrongdoing would not have occurred—or would have occurred 
to a much lesser degree—were it not for their facilitation.”128 Because corporations are less 
likely to be direct perpetrators this aiding and abetting status is particularly relevant since it 
allows for the possibility to show of facilitation. 
 
5.2 International Tribunals  
5.2.1 Introduction to Tribunals 
One way of pursuing corporate accountability for the international core crimes is through the 
court system. While this is generally done at the domestic level, being that the cases are 
international and criminal in nature there is some precedents stemming from international 
tribunals. Because the crimes committed concern the most heinous acts in society, corporate 
accountability cases have been brought forward in Nuremberg, discussed at the International 
Criminal Court, and claimed jurisdiction over at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, all three 
will be discussed below. 
 
5.2.2 Nuremberg – Industrialist Cases 
When speaking about corporations and international criminal law, scholars often point to the 
IMT’s “industrialist cases” as precedent. The IMT conducted a series of trials against the heads 
of German industry for their involvement in the crimes committed in World War II. The end 
result were three separate industrialist cases: Flick, Krupp, and IG Farben. These cases 
represented a condensed version of the crimes committed by or contributed to by German 
Industry. The enterprises represented in these trials consisted of coal and iron mines, chemical 
production, construction, and armament manufacturing, among other things and the crimes 
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committed included persecution and use of slave labor, among a lengthy list of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.  In Flick, six defendants were prosecuted for crimes against humanity 
and war crimes through their use of slave labor and prisoners of war, plundering, and the 
persecution of the Jewish people, as well as the “Aryanization” of their properties, and 
financing and criminal membership the SS.129 In Krupp, 12 defendants were prosecuted for 
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity for plundering and use of slave 
labor and prisoners of war, as well as deportation of foreign and German citizens, and 
conspiracy to commit these crimes.130  In IG Farben, 24 defendants were prosecuted for crimes 
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity for plundering, slave labor, and 
conspiracy to commit these acts.131 
The significance of the industrialist trials was that it was the first time that industry was tried 
in an international criminal setting. The cases showed the legitimacy that corporations have the 
power to commit abuses. The cases did not however, put the corporations themselves on trial, 
but rather those considered to be most responsible – generally the company directors. This 
reasoning was because, as the tribunal famously held: 
“crimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract entities, and only 
by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international 
law be enforced…individuals have international duties which transcend the national 
obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state.”132  
Though the IMT ultimately agreed it would not prosecute corporations, only their leadership, 
it did not rule out the possibility of doing so, and as a result pursuing true corporate criminal 
liability at the international level was “never rejected as legally unsound.”133 According to 
Bush (2009), criminal liability for entities in this context was rejected because of how the 
occupation forces (U.S., Great Britain, France) wanted to handle the trials, and placing 
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corporations as entities on trial would not have been regarded as “novel” in comparison to the 
introduction of other aspects of postwar legal accountability at the time.134 Moreover, because 
the IMT went on to prosecute criminal organizations, there is leeway and light judicial 
precedence for organizations and corporations to be tried criminally on the international 
criminal level.  In addition, the industrialist cases, and the IMT more generally, set the stage 
for future international tribunals, creating the foundation of understanding and definitions of 
the core crimes, and setting a precedent of individual criminal liability. Moreover, these trials 
showed that individuals outside of the state had the capabilities to commit atrocities.135  
Although scholars frequently point to the industrialist cases as a basis for corporate liability, 
the results of the cases were not all necessarily that remarkable. In Flick, 3 of the defendants 
were acquitted and 3 were sentenced, with those sentenced to seven years imprisonment being 
the highest and 2.5 years being the lowest.136 In Krupp, 11 out of the 12 defendants were 
convicted and were given sentences ranging from time served and 12 years.137  However, a 
significant outcome of this was that Alfried Krupp himself was “ordered to forfeit all of his 
real and personal property.”138 Finally, in IG Farben only 13 of the 24 defendants were 
convicted and sentenced between 1.5 years and 8 years imprisonment.139 The sentencing of 
those convicted is notably comparatively rather low. Even compared to the other trials of the 
IMT, the sentencing significantly lower.140 For example, in Pohl where defendants were 
charged with conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity (in addition to a 
war crimes count, crimes against humanity count, and count of criminal membership) the range 
of those sentences were between a death sentence and 10 years imprisonment in the original 
ruling.141 The difference was that the industrialists hold a background that gave them leniency. 
Moreover, the short sentences granted for the industrialists were not even completely served 
out, with Krupp petitioners benefitting from an order of “equalization” which led a sentence 
reduction to match that of Farben and Flick, bringing down the sentence to time served.142 To 
add insult to injury, Alfried Krupp, a man who was convicted of crimes against humanity, was 
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returned his confiscated property, resumed control of his company two years after his release 
and was named “the richest man in Europe – and perhaps the world” by Time Magazine by 
1957.143 Notably, in the Time Magazine article that accompanied the cover photo, 2 sentences 
are dedicated to his conviction as a war criminal and the rest focus on his wealth and success.144 
While these trials were extremely important for establishing precedents of individual criminal 
responsibility, and attributing crimes to non-state actors, they did not set a strong enough 
precedent for holding corporate actors accountable for international crimes. Using the 
industrialist cases as precedent, it is no wonder that corporate immunity is rampant over 70 
years later. The trials and sentences and eventual acceptance these industrialists back into their 
seats of power mirrors modern day corporate impunity. Currently, there are very few trials of 
corporations for atrocities, just as the number of cases in the industrialist cases only represented 
a few of those arguably culpable within the private sector.  
 
5.2.3 International Criminal Court  
During the drafting of the Rome Statute, the ICC’s founding document, there was a debate as 
to whether include legal persons and corporations along with natural persons in Article 25, 
which establishes criminal responsibility.145 Ultimately, legal persons were left out of the 
Rome Statute, failing to allow the Court to exercise jurisdiction over corporate entities for the 
crimes within its jurisdiction. Since then, scholars have begun to advocate on behalf of an 
amendment to include legal persons within the scope of the Rome Statute.146 This would allow 
for corporations as well as other legal entities to be included into the jurisdiction of the Court.  
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While the idea of expanding the jurisdiction of the Court addresses the issue of corporate 
liability, this type of amendment will likely not be made for several reasons. First, as with when 
it was written, the prosecution of the legal persons is not the point of the Court, nor a priority. 
The ICC’s goal is to hold those most responsible accountable for the worst crimes in humanity, 
and while corporations can commit these crimes, it is far more likely that those higher up in 
the corporation would be held responsible rather than the entity itself. Because a company 
cannot face jail time like a person, it can seem less appealing to take on this sort of case. In 
addition, the Court under its current mandate alone is facing an enormous amount of pressure. 
Currently, the Court has 13 open investigations, each involving a large number of alleged 
crimes, as well as 9 situations under preliminary examination.147 The volume of the situations 
and contexts that must be investigated and prosecuted under the Court’s mandate is notable 
already, so any expansions to jurisdiction will add substantially to the Court’s workload and 
will have to be accompanied by an increase in resources, which State Parties will be reluctant 
to give.   
Prosecuting a corporation in this setting can also distract from the mission of the Court. As 
mentioned in the work of Payne and Pereira (2016), the discussion of expanding the jurisdiction 
of the Court to include corporate entities was supposed to be discussed during the Kampala 
Review in 2010; however, this was overshadowed by the discussion on the crime of 
aggression.148  Moreover, during the initial discussions in Rome, legal persons were considered 
to be included, with organizations following under this category as well. However, because the 
Nuremberg trials had included the criminalization of certain organizations149 there was 
uncertainty as to whether or not to include them in the Rome Statute as well. But ultimately, 
as Clapham (2000) puts it, “the Nuremberg precedent left many observers with a fear that 
criminalizing legal persons could lead to unfair collective punishment.”150 This seems strange 
as ultimately the IMT precedents were very weak in terms of imposing corporate liability, but 
the fear stemmed out of the membership of criminal organizations. Regardless, having already 
discussed it, and Court being already stretched out, under constant fire from critics as is, and 
since corporate liability in not a priority, it will be unlikely to be included as an amendment. 
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However, it is not completely written off by the Court or State Parties as at the most recent 
Assembly of State Parties (herein “ASP”) in December 2019, there was a side event hosted by 
Association Francaise pour la Promotion de la Competence Universelle entitled “The 
Prosecution of Economic and Financial Crimes: Towards an Extension of the ICC’s 
Jurisdiction?” which included a discussion about increasing the court’s jurisdiction. 151 
Second, as will be mentioned later in this paper, there is a dramatic lack of consensus on the 
topic of corporate liability for international crimes between domestic systems. Scholars and 
legal practitioners alike are at odds on multiple fronts of the corporate liability debate, and 
domestically the systems differ completely by country, even within civil and common law 
systems. Therefore, negotiations between 123 of the current member states will be extremely 
difficult and time consuming as there has not been a generally accepted customary international 
law established. However, as mentioned, the debate on customary international law is ongoing 
so the potential for it to evolve to something more agreed upon is there.  
Third, member states are extremely wary of further amendments to the Rome Statute.  During 
the most recent ASP in December 2019, a new amendment to the Rome Statute was passed in 
order to allow the crime of starvation, which is a war crime under the Statute, to apply to non-
international conflicts as well.152 Although this was passed unanimously, several states made 
calls to halt further amendments to the Rome Statute for the time being.153 Going back to the 
first point, some member states expressed the need to focus on the Court’s goals rather than 
attempting to gain further jurisdiction, with the New Zealand delegation stating, “We consider 
that the priority in this period in the Court’s development should be on consolidating the 
Court’s role as an effective and credible judicial institution, rather than on the expansion of the 
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crimes within its jurisdiction.”154  Moreover, because corporate pressure will play a role in any 
amendments regarding their inclusion, member states will be more wary in pursuing this option 
because they’ll have to consider threats of pulling investments.  
There are many different issues standing in front of the Rome Statute’s amendment to include 
jurisdiction over corporate entities, with many of them being political. Kelly (2012), however, 
speculates that in order to get around the legal issues, the UN General Assembly could ask the 
UN Court, the ICJ for an advisory opinion on whether or not corporations could be prosecuted 
for committing genocide; and if the answer would be yes it would give the “green light” to go 
forward with amending the Rome Statute.155 Although this does not address the political issues 
involved with amending the Rome Statute, it is a creative way to approach to finding a legal 
pathway which would allow for corporate liability for international crimes. This approach, 
however, could just as easily backfire if the decision from the ICJ were to be in the negative. 
Such a precedent could destroy any hopes for corporate accountability for international crimes 
if it were to be proclaimed impossible for genocide.  
 
5.2.4 Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (herein “STL”) though relatively small in the scope of its 
mandate, has made massive contributions to the field of corporate liability at the international 
level, where it became the first international court to claim jurisdiction over not only legal 
persons, but specifically corporate entities.   
The STL has heard two separate cases involving corporate liability, Al Jadeed S.A.L. & Ms 
Khayat (herein “New TV S.A.L”)156 and Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. & Mr Al Amin.157 While both 
cases focus on the same issue of jurisdiction of legal persons, for the purposes of brevity the 
author will focus on New TV S.A.L. In New TV S.A.L., a corporate media entity, Al Jadeed, 
 
154 Delivered by Victoria Hallum, ‘New Zealand Statement’ (International Criminal Court Assembly of State 
Parties, 3 December 2019) <https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP18/GD.NZL.3.12.pdf> accessed 5 July 
2020.  
155 Kelly 2012, p.363. 
156 Al Jadeed S.A.L. & Ms Khayat (2015) STL-14-05. 
157 Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. & Mr Al Amin (2016) STL-14-06. 
 45 
along with its Deputy Head of News and Political Programming, were held in contempt for 
“allegedly knowingly and willfully interfering with the administration of justice” when Al 
Jadeed TV broadcasted reports revealing the identities of confidential witnesses to a separate 
STL case.158 The Contempt Judge ruled that the proceedings could not go forward with Al 
Jadeed TV as the STL did not have jurisdiction over legal persons under Rule 60bis of the 
STL’s Rules of Evidence and Procedure;159 however this ruling was overturned by the Appeals 
Panel which stated that the STL did in fact have jurisdiction over legal persons.160 In its 
decision the Appeals Panel asserted that “interpret[s] the term ‘person’ to include legal entities 
in the exercise of the Tribunal's inherent power over contempt proceedings.”161 Despite the 
intra-court disagreement on the jurisdiction of legal persons, and the eventual acquittal of the 
corporation in question on evidentiary grounds, legal persons are within the jurisdiction of the 
STL.162 Moreover, the Appeals Panel held that:  
“Indeed, corporate liability for serious harms is a feature of most of the world's legal 
systems and therefore qualifies as a general principle of law. Where States still differ 
is whether such liability should be civil or criminal or both. However, the Appeals Panel 
considers that, given all the developments outlined above, corporate criminal liability 
is on the verge of attaining, at the very least, the status of a general principle of law 
applicable under international law.”163 
This is extremely significant because the STL’s judgment is essentially stating that corporate 
criminal liability is a part of customary international law, or at least beginning to be. The 
Appeals panel backs this statement through showing that criminal liability for corporations is 
present in the majority of countries, as well as a movement by the UN towards greater corporate 
accountability for human rights related crimes.164  Because no other international tribunals have 
adjudicated on this exact subject, the STL was uniquely positioned in order to create a new 
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precedent.165  However, it must be noted that the STL is not regarded as an entirely international 
tribunal as it does have a domestic competent attached to it, and as such may not be given as 
much international criminal significance.166 Even so, this case, as the Contempt Judge 
described, this case was the “first in history of international criminal justice in which a legal 
person is accused of a crime”167 and as such will be looked at as precedent in examining future 
cases. At the international criminal level, one of the major barriers to corporate criminal 
liability is that none of the international criminal tribunals had claimed jurisdiction over legal 
persons, with the aim to hold the most responsible individuals accountable; however, now that 
the STL has ruled it has jurisdiction over legal persons there is the (very small) possibility that 
other international courts will follow suit. 
 
5.2.5 Tribunals Conclusion 
While the case law at the international level with regards to corporate accountability is 
disjointed at best, there are key pieces of precedent that are relevant moving forward. Firstly, 
going back to Nuremberg, the IMT never ruled out the possibility of prosecuting a legal entity; 
they just chose to move forward with individual criminal liability, a precedent still followed 
today at the international level. As mentioned, there was no legal basis to choose to partake in 
individual criminal liability for the perpetrators rather than the entity itself and as such may 
still be possible to implement in an international criminal setting. The prosecutions of the 
criminal organizations under the IMT show that organizations as an entity can be prosecuted 
under international criminal law and this can arguably apply to corporations since there are 
structural similarities. Though, the collective punishment that resulted may have been 
controversial. Second, is that corporate criminal liability is on the radar of the ICC. While it 
does not look like the Rome Statute will be amended within the next couple of years, this could 
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easily change as the leadership of individual countries change, which will alter the opinions 
present at the ASP. With different leadership in place, there could theoretically be a successful 
campaign towards amending the Rome Statute to include legal persons within in jurisdiction. 
Finally, the STL has claimed jurisdiction over legal entities, and corporations specifically. This 
shows that at least one international criminal tribunal does have jurisdiction over corporations, 
which may open up the path for creative ways of litigation to ensure corporate accountability, 
as well as serve as precedence for the foundation of a new international court governing 
corporate crimes. Although all three of these aspects seem minutely significant within the 
grand scheme of international criminal law, together they form the embryonic precedence that 
could be used to bring an end to corporate impunity on an international criminal level.  
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6. The Domestic Context: Corporate Criminal Liability  
6.1 Domestic Laws Introduction  
While most countries have some sort of system of corporate liability for crime, the extent to 
which it applies to atrocity crimes vary immensely. The majority of countries have ratified the 
Rome Statute, with 123 current state parties, and some of these countries have integrated the 
outlined crimes, such as crimes against humanity and war crimes, into their domestic 
legislation. In addition, 152 states are party to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.168 Together these set the basis for criminalizing some 
atrocity crimes domestically.  A study conducted in 2006 by Fafo found that of the 16 surveyed 
countries, 11 permitted for criminal liability for legal persons; of the other 5, 2 permitted the 
prosecution of legal persons for specific crimes, such as commercial crimes or environmental 
crimes.169 However, some countries, such as Germany, do not allow for the criminal 
prosecution of legal persons,170 and as such in German corporate liability cases, the directors 
must be prosecuted rather than the entity itself. While this is more of an exception rather than 
the rule, it does point to the large gap in universally accepted concepts within the realm of 
corporate accountability. The differences tend to be in the issue of a mens rea for corporations 
in atrocity crimes, as well as the desire to pursue individual criminal responsibility over 
corporate liability. Moreover, although there is domestic case law out there surrounding 
corporate accountability for atrocity crimes, because the cases can be so convoluted and 
complex, and can be brought forward either criminally and/or civilly, as well as against the 
legal person of the corporation and/or the natural persons in charge, it makes comparison, and 
establishing trends extremely difficult. Moreover, the laws surrounding business and atrocity 
crimes can be approached in different legal means, for example, in one case detailed below, in 
the U.S. it was tried as a sanctions violation case, while in France a criminal complaint has 
been brought forward for the same issues but on grounds of complicity in crimes against 
humanity. However, although disjointed, domestic laws are extremely important to observe in 
assessing corporate criminal liability because of the potential for identifying best practices as 
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well as major flaws, and the potential emergence of universally used principles surrounding 
this area.  
 
6.2 Jurisdictional Issues: Home State vs. Host State 
A large issue of debate with multi-national corporate crime is under which jurisdiction does 
the crime fall: under the state in which the offense was committed or under the state in which 
the corporation is headquartered? Typically, corporate crimes are committed in developing or 
conflict-affected countries usually in the Global South, and usually by businesses 
headquartered in the Global North.171 The business draw to these developing or conflict-
affected countries includes cheap costs (extraction, labor, etc.), less regulation, more lenient 
legal systems, and higher profit margins because of the assumption of greater  risk.  In this case 
the developing or conflict-affected country would be the “host state” in that they are “hosting” 
a foreign company, and the country where the business is headquartered, the “home state.” 
According to the UNGP, “States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory 
and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises,”172 which seems to assert a 
“host state” approach. However, when a corporation commits or contributes to an abuse in 
these countries the likelihood of facing legal ramifications can be lower due to the host state’s 
unwillingness or inability to prosecute.173 As such, the argument for the home state comes 
forward. The UNGP hold that states are neither “generally required” nor “generally prohibited”  
from regulating their state’s businesses operating outside its territory, and so it is up to the 
domestic systems to determine whether or not to regulate extraterritorial businesses.174 This 
uncertainty creates issues when both the host state and the home state are either unwilling or 
unable to prosecute, allowing crimes to be met with impunity. For example, in recent case law 
the United States has taken the approach that unless explicitly stated otherwise, laws written 
by U.S. Congress “only applies within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”175 This 
 
171 Dominik Brodowski, et al. Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability (Springer, 2014), (‘Brodowski 2014’), 
p.283. 
172 UN Guiding Principles, Article 1, p.3.  
173 Brodowski 2014, p.283. 
174 See Article 2 Commentary. UN Guiding Principles,  pp.3-4; Brodowski 2014, p.283. 
175 Morrison et al. v. National Australia Bank LTD. Et al. (2010) No. 08-1191; Oyez, ‘Morrison . v. National 
Australia Bank’ <https://www.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1191> accessed 28 July 2020; Sara Sun Beale, ‘United 
States’ Report on Prosecuting Corporations for Violations of International Criminal Law’ in S. Gless and S. 
Broniszewska-Emdin (eds.) Prosecuting Corporations for Violations of International Criminal Law: 
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means that U.S. laws do not apply outside of its borders, which was shown in the Supreme 
Court case Morrison v. National Australia Bank, in which foreign plaintiffs unsuccessfully 
tried to sue American defendants for crimes outlined in U.S. code, but that had occurred outside 
of the United States.176 This, however, is not the case everywhere, with the Netherlands, for 
example, frequently applying home state jurisdiction over abuses occurring abroad by its 
citizens.177 The problem therein lies that there is no uniform system by which to approach 
prosecutions, creating for a jurisdictional loophole that fosters impunity.  In situations where a 
host state is unable to prosecute and the home state does not allow for it, there becomes an 
accountability gap in which victims have no legal way to pursue claims. 
 
6.3 Country Examples 
Analysis of specific domestic systems offers the opportunity to see how effective the issue of 
corporate liability for international crimes is. In theory if each country had effective laws 
governing corporate liability, this would not be an issue at all. In order to get a better idea of 
best practices the author dives into two domestic systems, France and the United States, 
followed by a case study spanning both countries, in order to gage similarities and differences, 
and attempt to discover the efficacy of them in each country. 
 
6.3.1 France 
France is an interesting country in terms of corporate liability for international crimes because 
it has had several cases  (as well as several ongoing cases) in recent years concerning it, as well 
as new legislation regarding it. France allows for both criminal and civil liability for 
corporations with regards to corporate liability cases and business and human rights in general.  
Notably, in 2017 the French legislature implemented a new law that requires a due diligence 
 
Jurisdictional Issues (Revue Internationale Droit Pénal 2017), Vol. 88, Issue 2, pp. 307-341, (‘RIDP Vol. 88, 
Issue 2 United States Report’), p.325. 
176Morrison et al. v. National Australia Bank LTD. Et al. (2010) No. 08-1191, pp. 19-20; Oyez, ‘Morrison . 
v. National Australia Bank’ <https://www.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1191> accessed 28 July 2020. 
177 See for example, The Public Prosecutor v. Guus Kouwenhoven (2017) 20/001906-10. 
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requirement for businesses and its subcontractors, to conduct and report on human rights 
related risks, as well as allowing for civil suits to be brought forward if there is failure to 
comply.178 Though this only allows for civil cases, it has the power to effect entire industries 
domiciled in France. France also has several applicable provisions in terms of criminal law 
with regards to atrocity crimes and human rights abuses. France, being a longtime proponent 
and leader in international law, and having signed onto the Rome Statute, has aspects of the 
international core crimes written into its domestic law. Article 211-1 of the French Penal Code 
(herein “FPC”) criminalizes genocide, outlining the circumstances in a similar way as it was 
in the Rome Statute as well as the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide of 1998, but also adding types of punishment. It seems that Article 211-2 
may be even more intense than that of the Rome Statute, outlining that that public calls to 
commit genocide without the actual commission of them will also subject to punishment of 7 
years imprisonment and fine of 100,000 euros.179 The FPC also provides for the criminalization 
of crimes against humanity.180 In addition, the FPC provides that war crimes complicity can be 
achieved through its financing, as well as laundering money that was benefitted as the result of 
serious crimes.181  
Also significant to this paper is Article 213-1 of the FPC, which provides that legal persons 
can be held criminally liable for the aforementioned crimes:  
“Legal persons may incur criminal liability for crimes against humanity pursuant to the 
conditions set out under article 121-2. The penalties to be incurred by legal persons are: 
1° the penalties enumerated under article 131-39; 2° confiscation of any or all of their 
assets,”  
meaning that corporations which commit these crimes can be criminally tried. This also applies 
more broadly under Article 121-2 which states that “Legal persons, with the exception of the 
State, are criminally liable for the offences committed on their account by their organs or 
 
178 Sandra Cossart et al., ‘The French Law on Duty of Care: A Historic Step Towards Making Globalization 
Work for All’ (2017) Business and Human Rights Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 317–323., pp.317, 320-321; 
Juliette Lelieur, ‘French Report on Prosecuting Corporation for Violations of International Criminal Law’ in S. 
Gless and S. Broniszewska-Emdin (eds.) Prosecuting Corporations for Violations of International Criminal 
Law: Jurisdictional Issues (Revue Internationale Droit Pénal 2017), Vol. 88, Issue 2, pp.179-209, (‘RIDP 
Vol.88, Issue 2 French Report’) p.207.   
179 French Penal Code (Code pénal français), Article 211. 
180 French Penal Code (Code pénal français), Article 212.  
181 Referring to FPC Articles 121-7 and 324-1 to 324-9.  RIDP Vol.88, Issue 2 French Report, p.189. 
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representatives.”  This is a form of vicarious liability, allowing for a corporation to be held 
liable for the actions of its employees, also present in the United States. Article 121-2 
encompasses all legal entities, including all types of corporations, non-profit organizations, 
local public officials, and their associations.182  French law allows for the prosecution of both 
a legal person and a natural person who are accomplices of the same act.183 This creates the 
opportunity for a combination of individual criminal liability, in which a chairperson or 
members of a board of directors could be held criminally labile, but also the corporation as a 
whole. Moreover, in order to be an accomplice, under French law one is not required to share 
the same mens rea as the direct perpetrator.184 This is particularly relevant in pursuing 
corporate criminal claims as it is extremely difficult to prove that a legal person held the same 
mens rea as a direct perpetrator of atrocity crimes. In terms of punishment, the law allows for 
fining or even dissolution of corporations complicit in such acts.185 Moreover, France has 
strong territorial claims in terms of jurisdiction over crimes committed relating to French 
nationals and businesses domiciled within its territory, including in extraterritorial 
circumstances.186 France also follows the principle of universality, allowing for the prosecution 
of crimes that happened outside of France so long as it is a crime against an international 
convention and the perpetrator is residing with French territory.187 According to one 
commentator, “There is no legal obstacle to prosecute and punish companies for the 
commission of core and treaty crimes.”188  
With the combination of these laws, it appears that France has positioned itself in a way to 
effectively deter and prosecute corporations for their involvement in violations of the 
international core crimes. However, even though it seems like France would be the ultimate 
arena to prosecute corporations and get convictions, a guilty conviction in cases of this type 
are rarely achieved. Although compared to the rest of the EU France has a disproportionate 
amount of corporate accountability cases, more cases could be brought forward were it not for 
the procedural barriers. Procedurally, proceedings launched against a legal person (the 
corporation) would be similar to that of a natural person, with a victim bringing a case forward; 
 
182 RIDP Vol.88, Issue 2 French Report, p.181; French Penal Code (Code pénal français), Article 121-2. 
183 French Penal Code (Code pénal français), Article 121-2, para.3. 
184 Mann 2020. 
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in the penal code on an offense by offense basis. RIDP Vol.88, Issue 2 French Report, p.187.  
186 RIDP Vol.88, Issue 2 French Report, p.191-192.  
187 See 689-1, French Code of Penal Procedure (Code de procédure pénale français); RIDP Vol.88, Issue 2 
French Report, p.204-205. 
188 RIDP Vol.88, Issue 2 French Report, p.189. 
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French law also allows for NGOs to bring cases forward as well on behalf of victims and their 
work.189 However, unlike with a natural person, corporations are able to initiate procédures 
bâillons or “gag proceedings” against NGOs, in order to prevent them from speaking about the 
issues publicly.190 Although this practice is seen in other countries, such as the United States, 
it allows a certain amount of additional power to be granted to corporations, which natural 
persons do not have.  
While the law seems to be present to legally deter corporations from committing core crimes, 
as well as prosecute them once the crimes have taken place, this is rarely the case. In a 2019 
study conducted by the European Parliament, identified 11 of the 35 cases relating to business 
and human rights in the EU member states, have been/are ongoing in France,191 with at least 
one more criminal complaint having been filed since the reports publication.192 This seems to 
align with the viewpoint that France is serious about human rights abuses and international 
crimes as committed by corporations, as well as the French legal system for allowing these 
types of cases. Of these 11 cases mentioned in the study, 7 were still ongoing as of the date of 
publication, 3 had been dismissed, and 1 finished where the defendant was ordered to pay 
restitution.193 Notably, 4 of the cases involve complicity in war crimes or crimes against 
humanity, with 2 currently ongoing, 1 where the crimes against humanity charges have been 
dropped, and the final case has been dismissed altogether.194 The ongoing cases bring promise 
that there will be some news coming out of France with regards to corporate criminal liability 
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companies by Luxembourg-based entity Socfin and its subsidiary in Cameroon, which are both part of France’s 
Bolloré Group. Sherpa, ‘Sherpa and Other French Civil Society Organisations Face Libel Claim for Exposing 
Alleged Land Grabbing by Bolloré Group’ (European Coalition for Corporate Justice, 25 January 2018) 
<corporatejustice.org/news/3900-sherpa-and-other-french-civil-society-organisations-face-a-libel-claim-for-
exposing-alleged-land-grabbing-by-bollore-group> accessed 6 July 2020;  Sherpa, ‘Op-Ed – We Won’t Be 
Silenced by Bolloré Gag Suits!’ (Sherpa, 25 January 2018) <www.asso-sherpa.org/op-ed-we-wont-be-silenced-
by-bollore-gag-suits> accessed 6 July 2020. 
191 See “Table 1: Overview of identified court cases in different EU MS grouped per country.” European 
Parliament, ‘Access to legal remedies for victims of corporate human rights abuses in third countries’ (February 
2019) EP/EXPO/B/DROI/FWC/2013-08/Lot4/07, Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, 
(‘European Parliament Report 2019’), pp.20-22. 
192 Project Expedite Justice in conjunction with FIDH have submitted a criminal complaint against BNP Paribas 
in a Paris court as of November 2019. FIDH and Project Expedite Justice, ‘Sudanese victims ask French judges 
to investigate BNP Paribas’ role in atrocities: Questions & Answers,’(SCRIBD, 26 September 2019) 
<https://www.scribd.com/document/428282765/Sudanese-victims-ask-French-judges-to-investigate-BNP-
Paribas-role-in-atrocities-Questions-Answers#download&from_embed> accessed 7 July 2020. 
193 European Parliament Report 2019, pp.20-22. 
194 The ongoing cases are Amesys, BNP Paribas, and Lafarge, with the crimes against humanity charge being 
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in human rights and atrocity cases; but to what extent these will help or harm the fight against 
impunity is not yet able to be said. Regardless, case law coming out of France soon will serve 
as a precedent within France itself but also serve as a signal to the rest of the world. 
 
6.3.1.1 Lafarge  
One case that is of great significance to this area is the Lafarge case195 for allegations of 
complicity in crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by Islamic State (herein “IS”) 
in Syria, financing a terrorist enterprise, deliberately endangering workers, and utilizing 
exploitative and forced labor, between the years of 2011 and 2014.196 Moreover, Lafarge was 
accused of paying around €13 million in bribes and “check point fees” to armed groups who 
committed egregious acts.197 November 2016, two NGOs, Sherpa and the European Center for 
Constitutional and Human Rights (herein “ECCHR”), along with 11 Syrian former employees 
of Lafarge, together filed a criminal complaint with these accusations.198 As mentioned above, 
French law allows for the criminal prosecution of legal persons for crimes against humanity 
and the financing of war crimes, as well as the potential to be tried as a legal person and natural 
person if they are accomplices to the same act.199 As such, this case would seemingly be ideal 
for corporate accountability. However, as what seems to be a common theme with most 
corporate accountability cases in France, the charges most relevant to this paper, the complicity 
in war crimes, have been dropped because the elements were not met.200 Sherpa and ECCHR 
have appealed this decision,201 and however the court decides to approach this appeal, as well 
 
195 Note that since the alleged crimes were committed, Lafarge has merged with Swiss company, Holcim 
forming Lafarge-Holcim. ‘Lafarge Lawsuit (Re Complicity in Crimes against Humanity in Syria)’ (Business & 
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as why the dropped the complicity in war crimes charges in the first place will be of great 
significance to not only French corporate accountability cases, but the rest of the world as well.  
 
6.3.2 United States  
The relationship in the United States with corporate liability for atrocity crimes is extremely 
complex. The Department of Justice of the United States in a 1999 memo stated that it 
understands the benefits of charging a corporation with a crime, which can lead to immediate 
remedial actions having a ripple effect throughout the company’s industry.202 Under U.S. law, 
a corporation can be held criminally liable for violating federal statutes, as well as its board of 
directors or other leaders.203 Corporations are also, however, given many constitutional 
protections, such as due process rights and certain specific procedural rights.204 Although this 
seems strange because a corporation is not a natural person, it makes sense in the context of 
U.S. law which allows for “the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ [to] include corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well 
as individuals”205 and as such, rights given to a person could be given to a corporation as well. 
However, corporations are also granted an additional number of provisions to be considered 
before opening up a prosecution, under the U.S. Attorney’s Manual.206 These provisions appear 
to be similar to that of mitigating circumstances: looking to the corporation’s willingness to 
cooperate, existence of compliance programs, replacement of responsible management, among 
other things.207 Notably, this also includes accessing the “collateral consequences, including 
disproportionate harm to shareholders and employees not proven personally culpable”.208 This 
is problematic because collateral consequences of shareholders could be put above getting 
justice for victims, especially in the case of large corporations. Obviously if a corporation is 
convicted of an international core crime, there will be economic consequences of the 
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shareholders, and likely its employees, but this should not stop prosecutors from moving 
forward with a case. Moreover, since compliance programs are a mitigating circumstance they 
can also serve as a cover for committing abuses, as highlighted earlier in the soft law section; 
and in this case instituting a compliance program after the fact may even serve as a way to 
avoid prosecution altogether.  
The U.S. follows the doctrine of respondeat superior, a form of vicarious liability, meaning a 
corporation as a whole may be held liable for the actions of its employees or directors in so 
long as the person’s “actions (i) were within the scope of his duties and (ii) were intended, at 
least in part, to benefit the corporation.”209 Case law has expanded this even more so, to the 
point where “collective intent” can be accepted within the doctrine of respondeat superior.210 
Collective or shared intent is when while no one employee may have enough knowledge to 
satisfy the intent requirement, several employees together had enough collective knowledge to 
do so.211 In addition, case law suggests that corporations can be convicted for even the actions 
of its subsidiaries’ employees, and that the corporation does not have to profit as a result of the 
employee’s actions, just as long as that was the intent.212  
Another factor in corporate accountability for atrocity crimes is that the U.S. picks and chooses 
what it wants to prosecute criminally for in terms of typical internationally recognized crimes. 
For example, federal law allows for the prosecution of some major international crimes, such 
as for piracy – which is actually outlined in the US constitution213— but it fails to do so with 
some major aspects of customary international law, most notably crimes against humanity. 
While there are legal provisions for some of the core crimes, such as the crime of genocide214 
and war crimes,215 present in U.S. domestic law, crimes against humanity is left out. Certain 
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aspects of crimes against humanity, such as torture216 and human trafficking,217 are outlawed 
under domestic law, but the defining elements of the crime for crimes against humanity being 
“widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of 
the attack,” 218 and the extensive list of crimes that comprise it are completely absent in U.S. 
law. This means that holding an individual, much less a corporation, criminally liable for 
crimes against humanity is much more difficult in the U.S. as it must rely on established case 
law rather than concrete legislation.219 This is how the Alien Tort Statute began to be relied 
upon by human rights defenders in the United States, which is addressed below. The lack of 
appropriate, comprehensive internationally recognized crimes present in U.S. law creates a 
barrier for victims attempting to access justice. Moreover, the U.S. tends to follow the host 
state approach, as mentioned earlier and exemplified in Morrison v. National Australia Bank. 
This is backed in the Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum decision, where Chief Justice Roberts 
cited previous case law, claiming an aim to not interfere with any other countries’ laws in order 
to avoid “international discord”.220  
When a criminal case is brought against a corporation in the U.S. in relation to the core 
international crimes, it will likely not be labeled so. Because the U.S. does not support the 
Rome Statute and does not have crimes against humanity as part of the criminal code, when 
corporations come under criminal charges, they are mostly in the form of financial crimes, such 
as sanctions violations or money laundering. Though these crimes are bad on their own, they 
can be expanded upon further to give them a worse criminal label and the opportunity to help 
victims.   
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Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., (1957) 353 U. S. 138, 147. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. 
108 (2013), pp.2,4. 
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6.3.2.1 Alien Tort Statue  
While the focus of this paper is on corporate criminal liability, the civil liability granted under 
the Alien Tort Statute (herein “ATS”) is important to mention for the understanding of the 
United States’ approach to corporate liability. In many ways, for several years the United States 
seemed to be a leader in corporate accountability, through civil cases being brought forth  
against corporations for crimes that occurred in another country under the ATS. However, 
recent ATS case law, along with an overarching theme of avoiding international discord,221 has 
in recent years significantly weakened the U.S’s approach to corporate liability. The ATS, 
codified in the United States Code, 28 U.S. Code § 1350, states that: “The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”222 As such the ATS allows aliens (non-
U.S. citizens) to claim civil damages in U.S. courts for crimes violating international law. 
Although these are not criminal proceedings, human rights activists have seen the ATS as a 
creative way to get around some of the barriers of prosecuting for international crimes 
domestically, similar to the “legalized CSR” mentioned earlier. Moreover, under ATS crimes 
against humanity has been considered to be part of the customary international law,223 so even 
though it is not codified as part of the U.S. law, suits involving crimes against humanity can 
still be brought forward in American courts. 
However, a series of disappointing rulings have effectively stopped this route of pursing claims 
of violations of international law committed by corporations.224 While most scholars point to 
the ruling in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell (where the Court found that the ATS cannot be used 
to bring suits against foreign corporations) in discussing the limitations of using ATS for 
human rights cases, the real nail in the coffin for corporate liability under ATS came from 
Jesner v. Arab Bank.  In Jesner, the Supreme Court of the United States expanded upon what 
its ruling in Kiobel and held that corporations could not be sued under the ATS at all.225 
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Notably, in the Jesner decision, the Court points that the Kiobel decision relied heavily upon 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling that “relied in large part on the fact that 
international criminal tribunals have consistently limited their jurisdiction to natural 
persons.”226 Ironically, the absence of an international criminal tribunal’s ruling on corporate 
criminal liability is in part what ruled out its possibility under ATS, when providing jurisdiction 
would require greater cohesion on behalf of domestic systems.  
  
6.4 Case Specific – BNP Paribas 
One situation is particularly useful in demonstrating the importance of domestic legal systems, 
and involves both courts in the United States and in France. BNP Paribas (herein “BNPP”) is 
an example of a company who has allegedly contributed to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in several locations. The following analysis will focus on the approaches in two 
different countries for the same sequence of events: how the United States and France dealt 
with BNPP’s actions in Sudan between 2002 and 2008. Below is an analysis the actions of a 
company as a whole and how it has been and is currently being handled by the judicial system 
in two separate countries.  
BNPP is the largest bank in France, and is one of the five largest banks in the world in terms 
of assets.227 It served as the primary bank in Sudan during 2002 to 2008,228 a time when Sudan 
was under sanctions by the UN, EU, and U.S.229 Notably, Sudan was sanctioned for or its 
human rights and international humanitarian law violations committed by the State in Sudan 
against its people conjunction with the Janjaweed occurring in Darfur in the early 2000s.  BNPP 
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States of America v. BNP Paribas, S.A., (Statement of Facts) (2014) (S.D.N.Y) 14 Cr__, p.1. 
228 United States of America v. BNP Paribas, S.A., (Statement of Facts) (2014) (S.D.N.Y) 14 Cr__, p.1; 
Financial Times, ‘Payback for BNP, Sudan’s ‘de facto’ bank’ (1 July 2014) 
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229 The US imposed sanctions in 1997, which were then increased in 2007, the EU imposed sanctions in 2004, 
and the UN imposed sanctions in 2005. U.S Department of State, ‘U.S. Sanctions on Sudan,’ (U.S. Department 
of State Archives, 23 April 2008) <2001-2009.state.gov/p/af/rls/fs/2008/103970.htm> accessed 6 May 2020; 
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Sudan L 21/1 (EU); UNSC Res 1591 (2005) S/RES/1591. 
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“acted as a shield of legitimacy” allowing Sudan to access the foreign market, sell its natural 
resources, and buy foreign arms and aircrafts, which would have been extremely difficult given 
the sanction in place.230 
In 2014, BNPP agreed to a guilty plea for conspiring to violate US sanctions through the 
processing of transactions through the US financial system, which amounted to billions for 
Sudanese, Cuban, and Iranian entities.231 The results of the investigation into BNPP’s actions 
found that BNPP “went to elaborate lengths to conceal prohibited transactions” and “cover its 
tracks.”232 As such, BNPP was penalized $8.9 billion – the greatest penalty ever given to a 
corporation.233 Notably, this case is one that is purely financial, referring to the violations of 
sanctions for multiple countries, rather than the atrocity crimes for which the country was 
sanctioned. However, according to the US Department of State, the reasons for the economic 
sanctions were imposed upon the individuals and companies in Sudan was because they were, 
“linked to violence, atrocities, and human rights abuses in the region. Among other things, the 
sanctions are intended to increase pressure on all parties to end the violence in Darfur.”234 But 
instead of going after BNPP for complicity in the human rights abuses, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes, the U.S. attorneys decided to go after the sanctions violations. This 
seems to follow the pattern described earlier, in that in the U.S. prosecutions move forward 
with corporations who commit atrocity crimes, but instead of being tried for these crimes, they 
are tried for economic or financial crimes. Extremely relevant to this paper, is that throughout 
the U.S.’s investigation into BNPP, they were able to establish that BNPP showed an intent to 
violate the law through having various layers and means of concealing their illegal acts.  In 
addition, 5 years later, after years of litigation, a separate civil class action case,  Kashef v. BNP 
Paribas SA, was ruled upon by the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Manhattan.235  In this 
case “The plaintiffs claim that BNPP’s illegal activities enabled Sudan to acquire the funds 
with which to carry out the genocide and seek to hold BNPP liable under New York tort law 
for their personal injuries.”236 Again this shows the pattern that in the U.S. in pursing justice 
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236 Library of Congress, ‘United States: Federal Appellate Court Restores Lawsuit Against French Bank by 
Victims of Sudanese Regime’s Atrocities,’ (6 June 2019) <https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-
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for victims, civil suits must be pursued, and that criminal convictions will likely relate to 
financial crimes rather than the core international crimes, while core international crimes and 
human rights abuses will be approached civilly.  
The approach in France against BNPP is completely different though based on the same 
situation in Sudan. It must be noted that the legal systems between France and the U.S. differ 
completely, being the civil and common law countries respectively. To start off, there is already 
one criminal complaint against BNPP filed in France in relation to complicity in war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity which magistrates began investigating in September 
2017.237 This is in relation to the crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994, which the complaint 
alleges were possible due to BNPP authorizing a 1.1 million euro transfer which was used to 
buy 80 tons of weapons during the time of the arms embargo.238 The case is still ongoing. But 
with the two United States cases and the Rwandan criminal complaint against BNPP being 
investigated in the background, in September 2019, a group of NGOs filed another criminal 
complaint in Paris alleging that BNPP had been complicit in genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and torture, in addition to financial crimes within the context of Sudan.239 While this 
criminal complaint does mention financial crimes, the focus is based much more upon the 
complicity in the international core crimes, and is the first of its kind to try to hold BNPP 
accountable for complicity to crimes the international core crimes in Sudan.240 To that point, it 
is possible that with relying upon evidence present in the U.S. trials, including BNPP’s guilty 
plea, the criminal complaint may be successful in initiating a criminal trial.  
While in one respect this particular situation really reflects the differences in approaches for 
domestic law, it also highlights how creative argumentation can work to build upon decisions 
in other jurisdictions to create a different legal basis for the same conflict. And though this case 
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in France has only been filed as a criminal complaint, and has not yet been accepted by the 
judges for an investigation, there is great promise because of the contextual elements as well 
as BNPP showing a pattern of repeated complicity.  
 
6.5 Domestic Systems Conclusion  
As seen illustrated in this chapter, domestic laws vary country by country. Even countries that 
have sort of the “basic” legal requirements to prosecute a corporation for atrocity crimes, there 
are different ways through which these prosecutions come about that are fundamentally 
different based on legal systems. For example, as seen with France and the U.S., even though 
they both have provisions that allow them to prosecute corporations and, to some extent, outlaw 
some of the international core crimes (complicity to genocide, for example) the way that they 
approach corporate liability is completely different. Though the French system may be 
arguably better for victims in terms of criminal prosecutions, allowing them to be civil parties 
(in addition to NGOs with an interest) to criminal proceedings, the American system under 
ATS was able to give victims much more in damages. However, with recent case law, the ATS 
will not be able to be used against corporations anymore, extremely hindering victims access 
to justice in the U.S. Though France is a civil law system and the U.S. common law, the 
differences are apparent between civil and common law systems span also between countries 
within these systems. For example, as mentioned earlier, Germany notably does not allow for 
the criminal prosecution of legal persons at all, unlike the majority of civil law countries.241 
The differences in approaches at the domestic level are significant and pose obstacles for 
achieving a universal standard for corporate prosecutions. However, in order to achieve greater 
levels of corporate criminal liability an emphasis must be put first on domestic systems. 
 
 
 
241 Fafo Report, p.13. 
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7. Recommendations  
Upon beginning the research for this thesis, the author went in with the underlying assumption 
that there is enough international law precedent, although maybe disjointed and embryonic at 
times, to advocate on behalf of an International Tribunal for Corporate Crime to address 
corporate criminal liability for the international core crimes. And although the author has not 
completely ruled out this option, she no longer believes it to be the next step, for many reasons.  
Looking to all the major international criminal tribunals created, they were sparked by a single 
conflict: atrocities that occurred in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the need for truth 
and reconciliation commission in South Africa, for example. The ICC was finally created after 
a string of international tribunals in order to act as a one-stop shop for atrocity crimes 
committed in any of its 123 members states. However, because the ICC lacks jurisdiction over 
legal persons, corporate criminal liability at the ICC at the current moment is not possible, and 
the amendments to the Rome Statute are not probable, at least within the foreseeable future. 
But this being the case, corporate crimes unless committed in a greater context, simply do not 
have the backing needed to push forward an international tribunal for corporate crime. This is 
not by any fault of the lack of legal precedent or even a legal system to serve as a basis, but 
because corporate crime is committed usually in silos, and because of this corporate complicity 
in human rights abuses and atrocities are not able to garner the attention needed to push forward 
an entirely new tribunal.  
While no longer advocating solely on behalf of the creation of an International Tribunal on 
Corporate Crime, the author does offer several other recommendations:  
• The creation of a UN special session of the General Assembly on corporate liability as 
it relates to human rights and atrocity crimes 
There UN General Assembly has the power to create “special sessions” in addition to its regular 
annual sessions. In the past this has been used to address things like the “World Drug Problem” 
(April 2016) and hold a “Follow-up to the Programme of Action of the International 
Conference on Population and Development beyond 2014” (September 2014),242 and in 2021 
 
242 UNGA, ‘Special Sessions,’ <www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/special.shtml> accessed 7 July 2020. 
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there is a scheduled special session of the General Assembly “Against Corruption.”243 While 
the possibility of corporate crime being tacked on as part of corruption could be feasible, in 
order for the topic to get the full attention it deserves there must be its own special session. 
This would allow countries to come together to discuss corporate liability for violations of the 
international core crimes in their domestic systems and at the international level, as well as 
business and human rights in general. In that same line, this would be an ideal point to release 
the Draft Treaty to be up for debate and discussion. Having a dedicated session in which the 
international community can discuss corporate criminal liability will foster conversations and 
debates about best practices that can be brought home to domestic systems, whilst identifying 
if there are any universal practices, or look into how close we are to achieving a customary 
international law surrounding this area.  
• Discussion on home vs. host state jurisdiction at the international level and the 
possibility of universal jurisdiction for these crimes 
As mentioned, one of the main issues surrounding corporate criminal liability is whether to 
take a case against a corporation in the home or the host state, and what to do when there is 
host state is incapable and the home state refuses. There needs to be a universal system as to 
how to approach this. The Draft Treaty, in its current state, would allow for adjudicative action 
to be brought in places where the harm occurred, where the victims are from, or where 
corporate is domiciled.244 This approach is great because it allows for victims to have multiple 
options if they cannot take a legal action in their own country or in the country where the 
corporation is domiciled. However, this could go one step forward if universal jurisdiction 
were to be allowed for these types of crimes.  
Currently, many countries allow for universal jurisdiction for atrocity crimes not committed 
on their own soil, in so long as there is a connection to the country, for example, the accused 
is living there. This could function in terms of corporate criminal liability as well. If a 
corporation has a connection to a given country then legal action should be able to be brought 
against them in that country. For example, if an oil company domiciled in the United States 
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contributed to crimes against humanity in Kuwait, and this company had a regional 
headquarters in Paris, then judicial remedies for victims against this company should be able 
to be brought forward in Kuwait, the United States, or France. This is already the case for the 
majority of atrocity crimes as is. And we see this, for example, with IS fighters being on trial 
in Germany for crimes against humanity and genocide against the Yazidi population in Iraq.245 
If universal jurisdiction can be expanded to include legal entities within individual domestic 
legislation, then corporate criminal liability cases could be pursued in varying countries. 
According to a 2012 report by Amnesty International, 163 of the 193 states recognized by the 
UN “can exercise universal jurisdiction over one or more crimes under international law, either 
as such crimes or as ordinary crimes under national law,”246 so the most difficult part, 
establishing universal jurisdiction, is already provided for in the majority if countries. If 
countries will expand this to apply to legal entities as well as natural persons, then victims will 
have greater avenues to access justice.  
• Stronger domestic policies regarding the international core crimes and corporate 
liability, and business and human rights in general  
As this paper points out, the key to achieving corporate criminal liability for international core 
crimes is through domestic systems, from here all other problems are able to be addressed. 
Domestic systems need to make it such that legal entities can be tried for crimes committed 
traditionally by a natural person. Although this may not seem like a priority for the State, as 
mentioned in this paper, it allows for the closing of the “impunity gap” when executives 
individually do not have enough intent to be charged separately, but collectively there would 
be enough intent to bring forth a case. Allowing for corporations to be domestically labeled as 
criminal will have lasting impacts of how (or if) that business can operate, and it will 
reverberate across the industry in which it operates. To do this, domestic legislations must 
criminalize the core international crimes within their domestic legislations, allow for legal 
persons to be criminally tried for these crimes, facilitate a reasonably accessible process by 
which these sorts of complaints or cases (depending on the legal system) and be brought 
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forward, allow expanded types of jurisdiction, especially home state, and establish a joint 
international core crimes-corporate crime task force within their governments. All these steps 
will ensure for a much more cohesive approach to corporate criminal liability at domestic 
levels, which in turn can help establish customary international law principles which can make 
having an international court more possible. 
In addition, although this paper is centered more on the corporate criminal liability for the core 
international crimes, rather than human rights more generally, human rights policies towards 
businesses are extremely relevant. Moving towards a more human rights friendly business 
environment will prevent atrocities form happening in the first place. Some countries, such as 
France, have created for human rights due diligence requirements within their domestic 
legislation. Although this does not provide for strict corporate criminal liability, it does create 
for a stronger understanding of human rights in a business context. Through enforcing these 
sort of stringent due diligence checks, countries can effectively change the culture under which 
businesses operate. Moreover, as with in the French case, steps must be taken to avoid and 
prevent abuses as well as assess risks within supply chains, and then make sure these measures 
are “adequate and effectively implemented” so that businesses cannot just show a sort of policy 
without accompanying it with actions.247 In addition, in April 2020, the EU Commissioner for 
Justice, Heidi Hautala, announced that the Commission is committed to introducing due 
diligence requirements for environmental and human rights, as well as an enforcement 
mechanism at the EU level.248 Having one region, the EU, take up this effort though strict 
regulations will reverberate across the world, as seen through the power of the General Data 
Protection Regulation changing the way privacy and data protection are approached 
worldwide.  
• UN Draft Treaty be ratified and supported  
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The UN Draft Treaty is potentially one of the most powerful tools for holding corporations 
accountable, as such it must be ratified and supported by all nations. As mentioned, the Draft 
Treaty provides for multiple avenues for victims to pursue justice, including its own grievance 
mechanism, in addition to allowing victims to pursue claims in multiple jurisdictions. This hard 
law will put to shame the soft law mechanisms that govern the business and human rights world 
currently and allow for more effective means of obtaining corporate accountability. That being 
said, in order for this treaty to be effective it must have widespread ratification and support. 
This will be extremely difficult in seeing that similar legislation before, and not nearly as strong 
– the Norms – have failed. Moreover, because corporations hold so much power and influence, 
the likelihood of having corporations actively lobby against ratification is very high.  If only a 
handful of countries ratify this treaty it renders itself entirely ineffective. So, before the 
OEIGWG releases the next version of the draft it must ensure that there is at least a majority 
of support in order to move forward, without comprising on the aspects most fundamental to 
this treaty, especially with regards to enforcement and victim protection. 
• An end to (additional) soft law mechanisms surrounding business and human rights  
As this paper illustrates, soft law mechanisms are largely ineffective in monitoring business 
actions in relation to human rights abuses and atrocity crimes. As such, there should be no 
more of these guidelines put in place. Addressing corporate complicity in international crimes 
requires action and enforcement rather than guidelines by which states and businesses may or 
may not choose to follow. While all the guidelines and soft law mechanisms mentioned in this 
paper definitely have served their purpose and have aided in getting business abuses on the 
map, their time has passed and mechanisms that provide for enforcement and stronger victims 
protections are needed in order to move forward.  
• Stronger victim protections and legal aid 
Taking a case against a large corporation, especially in a conflict-affected area is extremely 
difficult. The Draft Treaty was the first document that actually acknowledged the presence of 
victims as a result of corporate crime, and it is only a draft. As such, in future legislation, victim 
protections must be a priority and ensured throughout the entirety of a corporate liability 
process at the international and domestic levels. Not only is it difficult on the part of the victim 
emotionally, but it also has the potential to affect their physical security. Countries must ensure 
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victim protections for those going up against some of the most powerful actors in the world; 
this entails physical protection for victims and their families, if requested. Also relevant are the 
financial impacts. The lawyers who take on these types of cases are at a significant 
disadvantage in comparison to a team of corporate lawyers, and as such countries should have 
legal aid, in the forms of grants or otherwise, in order to assist pro bono lawyers in tackling 
these uneven cases.  
• More cases being brought forward at the domestic level  
A major issue identified in this research was the disjointed nature of domestic systems with 
regards to corporate criminal liability for the international core crimes. To address this, the 
author encourages victims and lawyers to move forward with cases at the domestic level. This 
will allow for an expansion of case law and thus further internal discussion at the domestic 
level as to how to approach these cases and corporate criminal liability in general. Regardless 
of how these cases go, whether in favor of victims or of corporations, they are essential for 
progress in this area. Once cases become more publicized or reach a critical mass, governments 
will be forced to act to address these overlying issues. This is in no way suggesting that further 
crimes should be committed to ensure these cases be brought forward, but encouraging victims 
who feel comfortable that they have a case to bring it forward.  
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8. Conclusion 
The research in this paper presents a broad view of how to approach corporate criminal liability 
for atrocity crimes through analyzing its presence in soft law, international tribunals, and 
domestic systems.  With CSR forming the foundation of how businesses interact with human 
rights, it is easy to see how many measures fall short. While it is apparent that on the 
international level there are many guidelines in place surrounding how businesses interact with 
human rights and should work to prevent atrocities, the biggest obstacle of these soft law 
mechanisms is the lack of enforcement. Without any means to hold these corporations 
accountable for their “commitments” to any guidelines, they are largely ineffective. That being 
said, lawyers have begun to go around these soft law mechanisms, and are utilizing creative 
litigation strategies in order to attempt to make corporations held accountable for their actions. 
While the majority of international legislation surrounding corporate accountability is weak at 
best, the Draft Treaty shows promise, an attention to victims, as well as multiple types of 
enforcement mechanisms which have not be seen before. But as mentioned, because it is only 
a draft, there may be fundamental changes before its final version, but hopefully the same 
direction is maintained.  
In terms of international tribunals and precedents surrounding corporate criminal liability, there 
is not too much to go off of.  The IMT’s handling of the industrialist trials both served as a 
victory as well as a major roadblock for pursuing corporate accountability. While creating the 
precedent for non-state actors, and corporate actors specifically, to be tried for their 
contribution to atrocities, the industrialist trials also created precedent of weak sentencing for 
corporate actors. Compared to the other trials done by the IMT, the industrialists were treated 
much more leniently, which parallels today’s “slap on the wrist” tactics and that the majority 
of the law in this arena is soft law. However, the industrialists trials played a fundamental role 
in the creation of corporate accountability at the international level.  
The other international courts and tribunals referenced, the ICC and the STL were also 
extremely important in shaping corporate criminal liability at the international level. As 
mentioned, the ICC’s lack of jurisdiction over legal persons creates problems for prosecuting 
corporations for the core international crimes. A possible amendment to the Rome Statute has 
been advocated for by legal scholars, but due to political and financial pressures of the Court 
it does not seem likely that this will be the case, at least in the near future. This brings us to the 
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STL, which became the first international tribunal to claim jurisdiction over legal persons, and 
corporations in particular. Although there are caveats to this claim in that it was done only in 
a contempt case rather than an actual criminal case and that the STL is not strictly an 
international tribunal, it still serves as a marker for progression towards international corporate 
criminal liability.  
In order to further pursue international corporate criminal liability through international 
tribunals, however, the author asserts that countries must first come to a more cohesive 
approach within and across domestic systems. As mentioned in the recommendation section 
above this can be done through a UN General Assembly special session, conversations 
surrounding this topic, as well as a push for more case law at the domestic level. Through 
further work on corporate criminal liability at the domestic level, customary international law 
may emerge which will allow for these sorts of cases to be brought forward at the international 
level, if they are not effectively pursued at the domestic level. However, before this point can 
be reached domestic systems need to do a lot of work with regards to their handling of corporate 
criminal liability through their laws, but also through addressing the procedural measures 
which inhibit access to justice.  
Once these are more cohesive, if ever, then corporate criminal liability will have a place in 
international law when paired with precedence of the international courts and tribunals. One 
day an International Tribunal on Corporate Crime may be introduced, but this should not be a 
priority at the moment. As with the ICC, this type of court should be one of last resort, and as 
such the majority of countries should work to have effective domestic processes before making 
this type of assessment.  
In order to stop corporations from contributing to atrocity crimes and prevent further impunity, 
there must be stricter mechanisms in place. While lawyers may be tempted to pursue these at 
the international level, domestic systems will be the path through which this can truly be 
achieved. Moreover, the potential for universal jurisdiction to apply to legal persons would 
really allow for the expansion of these cases, and hopefully address the impunity gap. Until 
these changes are made however, we must look to ongoing cases that will shape the way the 
world views corporate criminal liability for the international core crimes.   
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9. Annexes 
Annex 1  
Questions for Interview with UN Responsible Business Engagement Specialist  
21 April 2020 Skype Interview 
1. What do you do right now working as a responsible business engagement specialist? 
2. When you’re creating these guidelines what sort of mechanisms do you base this on? 
Treaties, soft law mechanisms or best practices?  
3. Practically, when a company starts doing this remediation, what sort of steps do they 
take? Is it just case by case? 
4. How often do you think these remediations come as a result of a legal action brought 
against them versus self-identification of an issue? 
5. What do you see as the best approach to getting corporate accountability? Would it be 
through CSR? Legal compliance? Working sort of with what you do now? 
6. In places you’ve worked [South East Asia], how have the domestic laws allowed for 
either impunity or accountability? 
7. What was the greatest challenge in that sort of line of work? 
8. Do you think that the ruling elite and the government are more likely to move forward 
with business and human rights legal measures from international pressure? Or is it 
just going to be a slow change over time, if at all? 
9. Are there any questions that I have asked you that you think I should have asked you? 
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Annex 2  
Questions for Interview with U.S. Corporate Accountability Lawyer 
23 April 2020 Zoom Interview 
1. What does all does [your firm] do? And what specifically do you work on there? 
2. What do you think is the best approach to getting corporate accountability? 
3. What sort of domestic laws do you find most powerful for this work? 
4. What is the greatest challenge you have working with corporate accountability? 
5. What can legal design do for corporate accountability? 
6. When you are engaging in these legal processes do you utilize the sort of foundations 
of international human rights law, the guiding principles, the soft law mechanisms in 
place? 
7. Is there anything I haven’t asked you that you think I should ask you? 
8. When pursing civil suits for corporate accountability, do you think the penalties will 
be high enough to make a difference? Because if a corporation is so massive, they can 
factor this into their risk assessment.  
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Annex 3 
Questions for Interview with Corporate Accountability Lawyer (Non-Profit) 
29 April 2020 WhatsApp Interview 
1. Can you tell me about your current position and what you do there? 
2. You were recently involved in filing a criminal complaint on corporate accountability, 
can you tell me a little about that? 
3. What do you think your chances are of success would be in this case? As of February 
2019, there were 11 cases relating to corporate accountability in France with 7 
ongoing.  
4. Can you show that there is a pattern?  
5. Do you think that the current Rwanda case ongoing, do you think that will have any 
sort of impact? Maybe a combined effort by the investigative judges? 
6. When creating this filing what sort of mechanisms, treaties, domestic laws did you 
rely on? 
7. Do you think you would be able to argue customary international law? 
8. What do you think the greatest obstacles to filing this case in the host country would 
be? 
9. What factors do you consider before bringing a criminal complaint forward? 
10. What are the greatest challenges of working in corporate accountability? 
11. Could a complaint like this, if it were committed by a US corporation be brought 
forward in the US? 
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Annex 4 
Questions for Interview with PhD Candidate on Corporate Accountability (Civil Focus) 
30 April 2020 WhatsApp Interview 
1. Can you tell me a little bit about your PhD research? 
2. In doing this research what sort of mechanism do you rely on? Soft law? International 
criminal law? Domestic law? 
3. Looking at the research from your program, I saw that you divide it up into three 
approaches: tort, criminal, and state responsibility, which do you think is most 
effective in getting corporate accountability? 
4. Can you think of an example of a successful case for secondary criminal liability? 
5. What is the greatest challenge to corporate accountability that you have identified? 
6. I saw that you are interested in the analytical and evaluative framework for holding 
businesses responsible for their contribution to atrocity crimes, can you tell me a little 
bit about how that looks? 
7. Have you noticed a domestic system that is particularly good in the area of corporate 
accountability? 
 75 
Annex 5 
Questions for Interview with PhD Candidate on Corporate Accountability (Soft Law Focus) 
11 May 2020 Skype Interview 
1. Can you tell me a little bit about your PhD research? 
2. What do you think is going to be the most effective way of getting corporate 
accountability? 
3. What are your thoughts on the UN Draft treaty? 
4. Can you think of a successful case of corporate accountability? 
5. Have you noticed a domestic system that is particularly good in this area? 
6. How would you approach this sort of research? 
7. I saw you recently held a webinar on this topic, which cases did you take a look 
at? 
8. What do you thinking moving forward this area will look like? 
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